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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The 1930s was a time of tremendous change and 
upheaval for both Europeans and Americans. Nazi Germany was 
both the cause and determiner of many of these changes. What 
were American reactions to these changes? This is a paper 
about liberal American attitudes toward Germany in the 
inter-war years, particularly during the years from the rise 
of Nazism in 1933 to the beginning of World War II in 1939. 
By examining The Nation's reactions to Hitler, Nazi Germany, 
and their policies, an understanding can be gained of how it 
effectively dealt with the ferment of the 1930s. 
The Nation is important to focus upon and study on 
two accounts. First of all, although there may be no 
specific representative of the liberal press, Nation was 
foremost among liberal periodicals. It was a widely read 
opinion maker whose influence went much further than its 
numbers in circulation would indicate. Secondly, The Nation 
demonstrated its ability to integrate its liberal beliefs 
with its reactions to Hitler and Nazi Germany. In this 
sense, h Nation is representative of the turmoil liberal 
thinkers of the 1930s underwent in their coming to grips 
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with Nazism and its repercussions for Europe and the United 
States. 
The impact and aftermath of World War I led to the 
development of divergent strands of liberal thought. Some 
thinkers supported pacifism, others came to accept 
isolation, and still other liberals adopted collective 
security. Some judged it necessary to accept and support the 
Soviet Union while other liberals could not. Although 
liberals disagreed on the course of action to take in 
response to Nazism, they shared a common abhorrence and 
rejection of the policies and actions of the German National 
Socialists. No one has ever had to deal with the likes of 
Hitler and as a result, some liberals had difficulties 
accepting the truth about Nazi policies and actions. Instead 
they clung to their intellectual beliefs, which were quickly 
shown to be outdated and inadequate. The problems liberals 
confronted in corning to terms with Hitler were reflective of 
the same kinds of difficulties the American public had in 
responding to Hitler's dictatorship. Some liberals, however, 
were able to see the truth about Nazism and cope with the 
upheavals Hitler triggered without violating their liberal 
beliefs. The Nation is an excellent source because it was 
foremost among these progressive thinkers. 
How The Nation viewed and reacted to Hitler and the 
Nazis was mainly determined by its liberal view point. A 
brief history of The ~~~~, its founder, editors, and basic 
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concerns will provide a perspective on its attitudes and 
concerns toward Nazi Germany. 
The Nation was first published on July 6, 1865, by 
its founder and first editor, Edwin Lawrence Godkin. A 
publisher's prospectus listed the objectives of the newly 
formed Nation. Three were directed at the advancement of 
freedom and civil rights in the South. The other goals were 
"the accurate discussion of public affairs, the diffusion of 
democratic principles, an emphasis on the importance of 
public education and an art and literacy criticism."l Though 
the emphasis varied with each editor, The Nation, 
consistently, kept to its objectives. Godkin was greatly 
influenced by the liberal thought of his day and it had been 
his intention to found a liberal non-partisan weekly. 
Godkin's ambition was fulfilled by Th Nation as "its 
standard of judgment through out all its history has been 
its conception of that congeries commonly referred to as 
'liberalism' .,,2 
What does liberalism mean in terms of the kinds of 
issues The Nation was concerned with? First of all, liberal 
thought is rooted in a main endeavor which strives for, as 
its chief aim, the happiness, freedom, and progress of all 
lAlan Pendelton Grimes, The Political Liberalism 0 
The New York Nation (Bloomington:-Indiana University Press, 
1965-)-,-p. vii. 
2 Ibid .• p. v. 
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mankind. American liberalism, in addition, counts as one of 
its tenets the concept of individuality. According to 
liberal ideas, the success or failure of a society can be 
measured by how well individuals attain their fullest 
potential. American liberalism is also identified with the 
defense of individual civil liberties, which translates to 
the defense of the minorities of a nation. The liberal 
concept of liberty includes every single aspect of human 
life. Freedom of thought, expression, and opportunity are 
important liberties. American liberals have been advocates 
for 	these essential liberties. In fact, liberalism 
has demanded a positive program of governmental action 
to provide the conditions--economic, political, and 
other--which would give the common man the opportunity 
to realiz 3 the essential dignity to which he is entitled. 
All of the forgoing tenets of liberalism were 
adhered to by he Nation in its pages and it viewed itself 
as the defender of liberties not only in the United States 
but throughout the world. The principles of liberalism were 
used as the standard by which everything was analyzed in The 
Nation. 4 That is why in 1919, the weekly advertised itself 
as "the foremost exponent of uncompromising liberalism in 
3D• Joy Humes, Oswald Garrison Villard, Liberal of 
the 1920's (Binghampton: Syracuse University Press, 1960--r;-
p. 21. 
4 Alan Pendelton Grimes, The Political 
The New Nation, pp. v, ix. 
Of 
S 
America."S Liberalism was an important element of the 
character of The Nati n's new owner and editor, Oswald 
Garrison Villard, who took possession of the weekly in 1918. 
Karl L. Bickel, President of the United Press, declared, in 
1928, that Villard's Nation was "[t]he best obtainable 
barometer on the state of the liberal opinion in the United 
States.!!6 Villard, who was a graduate of Harvard, pictured 
himself as a crusading editor and, under his guidance as 
Editor-in-chief, The was to achieve foremost 
prominence in the United States as the conveyor of liberal 
thinking. Not only had the weekly gained the pinacle of its 
notoriety under Villard, but its influence as well. 
Who was reading The Nation for it to achieve such 
success and whom did it influence with its liberal opinions 
and concerns? The Nation was written for a more educated 
audience than the general masses and "it in part reflected, 
in part stimulated, but without doubt influenced the 
political thinking of America.,,7 Writing in 1939, Professor 
Arnold Thurman believed both The tion and The New Republic 
deserved high praise and laurels for their place in American 
thought. "In this country, periodical literature has been 
SThe Nation 109 (October 2S, 1919):536. 
6 Karl A. Bickel The Nation 147 (July 9, 1938):ii, 
facing p. 53. cited in Alan Pendelton Grimes, Th Political 
Liberalism Of The New York Nation, p. ix. 
7 Alan Pendelton Grimes, The Political Liberalism 0 
The New York Nation, p. ix. 
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more important than books and there have been more new 
notions put across by these two publications than any other 
two in the history of American letters.,,8 
The Nation garnered such high praise because it had 
tremendous influence upon liberal thinkers. In 1865, the 
weekly started with a circulation of 5,000, and by 1928, 
over 40,000 issues were being published each week. 9 During 
the years of its publication, up to 1940, The Nation never 
achieved a vast circulation, yet it was able to influence 
important, prestigious people in the world: newspaper 
writers, college professors, and government leaders. 10 The 
journal, in addition, counted among its subscribers 
libraries, universities, and other educational centers. The 
Nation's contributors included such influential people as 
Harold Laski, Ramsey McDonald, Archibald McLeish, William 
Gram Summner, Stuart Chase, Freda Kirchwey, Bertrand 
Russell, H. L. Mencken, Louis Fischer, Reinhold Niebuhr, 
Thomas Mann, and many others. 
Oswald Villard knew that The Nation was an 
influential part of American journalism, and when he left 
BArnold Thurman cited in Malcolm Cowley and Bernard 
Smith, Books That Changed Our Minds, (New York: Doubleday, 
Doran and Company, Inc., 1939), pp. 8-9. 
9Michael Wreszin, OswRld Garrison Villard, 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965), p. 196. 
lOSara Alpern, Fr Kirchwey: A Woman The 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 58. 
n 
----
7  
the editorship in 1932, he wanted to insure the same high 
standards for its future. He asked Freda Kirchwey to become 
the executive editor of the editorial board. Villard 
believed Kirchwey would carryon the traditions at the 
weekly. Villard remained at The on writing his column, 
"Issues and Men. 1f Freda Kirchwey wanted to maintain the same 
crusading nature of the journal. This was nothing new at the 
weekly. "'From the days of Godkin down The Nation has in the 
strictest sense been a propaganda journal. I mean simply a 
journal devoted to fighting with words for the particular 
set of beliefs which its editors and owners have held' .lfll 
There was a continuance of the same liberal standard through 
Kirchwey's fight against fascism. Even though Kirchwey 
carried on in the same spirit, there was a difference in her 
editorship. What was new in Kirchwey's use of The Nation was 
the stress she placed on it as a way to fight fascism and 
the ills it perpetuated. Kirchwey saw the fight against the 
fascists as a moral issue. The struggle against fascism, for 
the new editor, was a battle between "Good and Evil." She 
believed that if fascism won the battle, the world was 
doomed. Kirchwey, therefore, envisioned the fight against 
IlFreda Kirchwey, speech, August 30, 1939, p. 2, 
#324, Freda Kirchwey papers Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe 
College, MC 280 (hereafter cited as FK MSS) cited in Sara 
Alpern, Freda Kirchwey, p. 100. 
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the Nazis as her crusade to create hope for the world by the 
"successful resistance to international fascism.,,12 
So powerful was Kirchwey's desire to fight fascism, 
Hitler, and the Nazis that it interfered with her judgment 
of the Soviet Union's purges of 1934-38. Despite the 
abhorrent actions of the Soviets, she continued to include 
them as part of her collective security stance. The Nation, 
however, was not a mirror of Freda Kirchwey's viewpoint. The 
journal did not reflect only her views toward collective 
security. The whole range of liberal thought from extreme 
pacifism to a more militant collective security was 
presented in many issues of The Nation. Most of the editors 
at the weekly agreed with Kirchwey's assessment of 
collective security. American neutrality policy was 
supported by only one man, Villard. His disagreement with 
Kirchwey and the other editors grew so intense that by late 
1939, Villard was forced to resign. In 1937, the weekly was 
sold to KirchweYi as a consequence, her views toward the 
Soviet Union became more dominant in its pages. 
The Nation's fight against fascism, Hitler, and the 
Nazis during the inter-war years and the preponderance of 
articles on the German situation is the main reason it was 
chosen as the primary source for this paper. Issues of both 
The Nation and The New Republic were examined for the years 
l2Freda Kirchwey to Hugo Van Arx, March 18, 1938, 
#108, FK MSS cited in Sara Alpern, Freda Kirchwey, p. 101. 
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between 1933 to 1938. Nation's articles and editorials 
easily outnumbered The New 's output by a two to one
--"---­
margin. A more radical publication, The New Hasses, 
realized, in 1933, that ~ation was leading the fight 
against fascism in Germany. An appeal was made to the 
readership of The N "There are two things we can 
do about the experience of the last six months in Germany. 
One is to scream like the 
Due to its high visibility on German fascism, The 
Nation makes an excellent source. The weekly is rich in 
material and its arguments are effectively presented in 
several formats. Some articles are in depth analyses of Nazi 
Germany and its policies while other articles are eyewitness 
accounts. Several reporters were sent to Germany to observe 
conditions first hand. Other articles were contributed by 
people who had actual experiences in Germany. For example, a 
memoir by a former concentration camp inmate was printed. 
Letters from Germany, detailing German events and 
atrocities, were printed in the pages of Nation. In 
addition, the journal presented its attitudes and views in 
its editorials. Because The Nation printed such a variety of 
reporting, its crusade against fascism is more persuasive. 
All of The Nation's various forms of arguments, taken 
13Scott Nearing, cited in "Against the scist 
Terror in Germany," The New Hasses (April, 1933), p. 12. 
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together, were highly effective tools in Freda Kirchwey's 
battle against the German fascists. 
Analyses of the various issues presented in The 
Nation reveal that the journal was concerned about several 
aspects of ~azi rule in Germany, Chapter II, of this paper, 
summarizes the attitudes of The Nation toward Hitler's 
corning to power in 1933, and the rulers of Nazi Germany. To 
begin with, the conditions that allowed Hitler to establish 
his dictatorship are accurately portrayed. In addition, the 
journal believed the fascist rulers to be deplorable men 
with no favorable personal characteristics. The weekly not 
only wanted to expose Nazi leaders for the kind of men they 
were, but it also desired to give its readers a view of the 
kind of man and leader Hitler actually was. Hitler had 
hypnotized the German people, but The Nation was not taken 
in by his effective rhetoric. This negative view of Hitler's 
character did not mean, however, that The 
underestimated Hitler's abilities. On the contrary, the 
weekly understood what he was capable of in his rule. Hitler 
was the true dictator of Germany's future and this was 
portrayed by the journal with clarity. 
The most destructive element of the Nazis was the 
violent nature of their personalities and, hence, the savage 
policies of the Third Reich. This argument is presented in 
Chapter III. The Nation believed the Nazis abused many 
people and persecuted various groups in Germany to cement 
11  
their dictatorship in place and to further their various 
policies. The Nazis, through legal means (by promulgation of 
laws) and illegal methods (generally violent in nature), 
were able to alter Germany to their desires and convictions. 
In general, women, most political and cultural groups, and 
minorities (especially the Jews) suffered the most under the 
Nazis actions. The Nati n reported what happened to Nazi 
victims, the humiliation and the atrocities they suffered. 
One of the groups of people which suffered 
considerably under Nazi rule was the workers of Germany. 
Chapter IV presents a summary of The Nation's report of the 
economic conditions in Germany during the inter-war years. 
Though the Nazis were unsuccessful at first in changing the 
economic conditions in Germany (which was what The Nation 
expected), the Nazis were able to achieve success by 
instituting full employment through their armament program. 
The weekly contended that the workers gained no benefit from 
any of the programs established by the NaziS. Only the state 
benefited and, in this case, the state meant Nazism. 
Individuals were not meant to benefit. Hitler instituted 
other programs and policies to achieve his aspirations. The 
Four-Year Plan, propaganda, heavy taxation of German 
citizens, and an increased national debt were methods 
utilized by Hitler to gain his goals. Hitler wanted a war 
time economy and financial independence from other nations 
to achieve his domestic and foreign policy aspirations. Th 
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Nation linked Germany's lack of essential raw industrial 
resources to Nazi intent to seize regions and countries that 
could supply the needed materials to equip the Third Reich 
with the weaponry necessary for a highly mechanized war. 
According to The Nation, Hitler needed the weaponry 
that German industry could supply because of his ambitious 
and aggressive foreign policy objectives. Chapter V is an 
analysis of Hitler's goals and how he intended to execute 
them. This chapter also summarizes the journal's response to 
Hitler's foreign policy. Hitler intended to revise the 
Treaty of Versailles. He wanted the regions and nations that 
he believed were Germany's right. he Nation realized Hitler 
wanted to achieve his pan-Germanic empire as swiftly as 
possible. The Third Reich began the process by pulling out 
of the League and starting its armament program. Next, 
Hitler marched his armies into the Rhineland and waited to 
see if Germany was going to be successful in its attempts at 
Anschluss with Austria. 
If Hitler was to achieve all of his goals, Th 
believed he would have to use additional methods for 
his intended takeovers. Hitler used a couple of methods in 
his attempts to carry out his plans. Nazi agents and 
propaganda cells were recruited and organized to achieve 
Hitler's goals. 
The rest of Europe was unable to stop Hitler. The 
Nation declared there was one answer to keeping the United 
13  
States out of the upcoming war. Collective security, 
expressed through economic sanctions and military 
involvement, if necessary, was advocated by all except one 
at the journal. In addition, collective security advocates 
delineated their objections to neutrality. By 1939, The 
Nation, through Freda Kirchwey, had progressed in its view 
to advocating the need for international military 
conscription to halt German fascism. The weekly asserted the 
United States was in real danger from the Nazis; therefore, 
American national security became part of the concerns of 
the weekly. The horrors and destruction that were occurring 
in the rest of the world could easily entangle the U.S. The 
Nation did not want America sucked into the Nazi vortex 
without preparation. The journal wanted the United States to 
emerge victorious from any such contest. The future of the 
world was at stake. The Nation assumed the worst of the 
National Socialists from the very moment they achieved power 
in 1933. 
CHAPTER II 

TH NATION'S ANALYSIS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF  
THE THIRD REICH AND ITS ATTITUDES  
TOWARD THE NAZI LEADERSHIP  
The Nation presented an accurate analysis of how 
Hitler attained power and entrenched his dictatorship in 
Germany in 1933. The times were indeed ripe for Hitler's 
effective techniques and manipulation. The weekly, on many 
different occasions, expressed its attitudes toward Hitler 
as the man and the leader of Germany. There is much to be 
learned from The Nation's attitudes toward Hitler and his 
spawn, National Socialism, as well as the rest of the Nazi 
leaders. The weekly saw no merit in Hitler's coming to power 
as it was certain his rule would have a destructive impact 
on Germany. The Germans' acceptance of Hitler was based on a 
fabric of lies, but because of their national character 
flaws, they shared the responsibility with the Nazis for 
following Hitler. The Nation did not accept that Hitler had 
the proper character to lead. He was considered an 
uneducated "barbarian" and the rest of the Nazis were 
described in less generous terms as moral degenerates. It 
was considered deplorable behavior when the Nazis lied about 
their treatment of the Jews and to governments to further 
14 
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Nazi foreign policy goals. Though the journal was disgusted 
by Hitler and his behavior, it did not underestimate him in 
any way. The Nation did not consider him to be a dupe of any 
one individual or group; instead, Hitler was the one in 
complete control. Most of what was written in The Nation 
about Hitler, the man, came from the early period of the 
Third Reich and the time right before the war. The Nation 
never praised Hitler in an unsparing manner, nor did it ever 
want to validate any of his words and deeds. The Nation's 
consideration of Hitler began when he took office and became 
a menace to Germany. 
The Nation examined how Hitler came to power in 
1933. Germany, in the early 1930s, was a country in turmoil 
and, as a result, the Weimar Republic was in trouble. The 
rise of fascism as a solution for Germany's problems was not 
an inevitable outcome. It was the chance happening of people 
and events that coincided with circumstances, set up by 
history, that made Germany ripe for the fascists. Hitler was 
appointed Chancellor of the Republic by President von 
Hindenburg on January 30, 1933. He became the head of a 
coalition government which seemed to be dominated by 
conservatives. After the new government was formed, Hitler 
demanded the right to hold new elections. The Chancellor 
received his wish and the elections \.ere set for the fifth 
of March. The Reichstag was dissolved on the first of 
February, only two days after Hitler had assumed office. 
16  
During the election campaign, the Nazis openly utilized 
terror tactics against all political opposition, especially 
the communists and social democrats. However, it was the 
burning of the Reichstag on the twenty-seventh of February 
that allowed Hitler to further his quest for absolute power. 
The Nazis arrested five men, who were alleged communists, 
for the arson. A communist scare was fomented throughout 
Germany by the ~azis. President von Hindenburg was persuaded 
by the cabinet to issue a decree which, in effect, abolished 
basic rights conferred by the Weimar constitution. This 
decree restricted the press and the activities of other 
political groups. It, in effect, muzzled the communists and 
the social democrats. In the plebiscite, on the fifth of 
March, the Nazis gained only 43.9 per cent of the votes cast 
by the Germans. It was only with the coalition of other 
nationalists that the Nazis were able to gain a majority of 
151.9 per cent. With the promulgation of the Enabling Law on 
the twenty-third of March, Hitler consolidated his powers 
and a totalitarian regime was established in Germany. 
The Nation argued that many events and circumstances 
were behind the founding of a totalitarian Nazi regime in 
1933. H. BrUning established a precedent for Hitler by 
initiating a method for avoiding the Reichstag. The 
President became the key. BrUning dissolved the Reichstag in 
1K• Hildebrand, T Third Reich, (Boston: George 
Allen & Unwin, 1984), p. 
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1930 and governed by decree. As a result, BrUning "became 
responsible not to the will of the Reichstag but to the whim 
of the President.,,2 Because of BrUning and his methods, it 
therefore became possible for President von Hindenburg, an 
ailing 86 year old suspected of senility, to appoint Hitler 
to a position of power. In addition, Hitler would not have 
been able to achieve control of Germany without the 
existence of other conditions. One of these was the economic 
situation in Germany. 
In 1932, German economic conditions were appalling 
as the Republic was one of the hardest hit by the 
depression. Fully one-half of the German workshops and 
businesses were closed and over one-third of the work force, 
6 million, was out out of work with no prospect of a 
change. 3 The Nation believed the socialists governments, 
after the war, did not go far enough in their programs; they 
were not thorough enough in their reorganization of the old 
regime. Many reactionaries, imperialists, and militarists 
were left behind in Germany and not replaced by the new 
order. Also, the Treaty of Versailles, which was forced on 
the Germans after their defeat in 1918, made governing for 
the Weimar Republic more formidable. The collapse of the 
2John Gunther, "Who Killed the German Republic?," 
Th Nati 136 (May 10, 1933):527. 
3"The German Republic Totters," The Nation 134 (June 
22, 1932):695. 
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Republic was a direct result of these factors which occurred 
during the crucial years after 1918, according to The 
tion. In summation, the weekly believed many factors were 
responsible: 
the economic distress; the sense of infinite wrong done 
to Germany by the Treaty of Versailles; the false 
accusation of sole responsibility for the war; the Ruhr 
invasion; the frightful loss of wealth due both t& the 
war and to the inflation, and many other factors. 
These incidents contributed to the Republic's inability to 
govern "plus the weakness of the government, the failure to 
carry the revolution through with vigor, and the survival of 
many militarists and monarchists are. . the reasons why 
the German Republic totters" and would, eventually, fail. s 
When Hitler won the elections in March 1933, a tone 
was established by The Nation during this period that was to 
be repeated over and over for the next few years. The weekly 
saw no merit in Hitler's coming to power. Europe, as a 
consequence, had gained another fascist dictator at the cost 
of the freedoms of the German people. The Nation contended 
"the only redeeming feature of this disaster to the 
democratic and liberal movements is that he won the 
Chancellorship by constitutional methods without resorting 
to violence.,,6 This particular comment is not to be 
6Editorial, "Hitler Hins,n The Nation 136 (March 15, 
1933):277. 
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construed as a compliment. The journal believed Hitler to be 
"incompetent to lead," because he knew nothing of financial 
and economic issues. Hitler came to power because he 
"deluded the masses who have looked upon him as a veritable 
savior."? Hitler was no such person; in fact, the truth 
could not be further from the Germans' perceptions. The 
final analysis, for The Nation, came to whether the German 
people would allow themselves to be intimidated "or will 
rise against the most unprincipled demagogue yet to curse 
Germany."S 
Obviously the German people were not going to 
immediately overthrow Hitler. After Hitler had been in power 
for six months, The Nation analyzed the impact of the Nazis 
on Germany. In so doing, the weekly gave an open account of 
its attitudes toward Hitler. It recognized Hitler to be 
remarkable in at least one way; he persuaded the Germans to 
vote away their freedoms. The establishment of totalitarian 
regimes are common throughout history, "but never before has 
a nation enjoying full right of speech thrown out its arms 
to a tyrant and voluntarily riveted the chains about its own 
neck." 9 
9Harrison Brown, "Six Months of Hitlerism," The 
Nation 137 (August 2, 1933):121. 
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The German people believed in an aberration, who had 
persuaded them to accept him for something he was not, a 
leader. In these words The Nation described Germany's 
attraction to Hitler. The German people's belief in Hitler 
was based on more than a delusion as their faith in him was 
founded on a fabric of lies. Hitler did better in this than 
Hachiavelli could wish for. "Never has there been a national 
movement so entirely built upon falsehoods and never have 
there been people so eager to swallow them as the exhausted 
and ill-treated Germans."lO Hitler had the capacity to see 
the attributes of the German people that he would be able to 
manipulate. Despite this particular ability, Th Nation did 
not believe that Hitler was, in general, an educated or 
civilized person, deserving of the leadership of Germany. 
There were too many contradictions in Hitler's personality; 
in fact, he was crude and somewhat illiterate. A reading of 
Hitler's Mein Kampf would confirm these observations. The 
Nation described Hitler's book as !'seven hundred leaden 
pages of autobiography."ll It portrayed his book as a 
"turgid mass of undigested history and personal self-
revelation which today cannot be quoted against him 
with[out] deadly effect. ,,12 Not only did Hein Kampf 
100swald Garrison Villard, "Issues and Men: The Nazi 
Child-Hind," The Nati n 137 (November 29, 1933):614. 
llHarrison Brown, "Six Months of Hitlerism," p. l2l. 
l2 Ibid • 
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reveal much about Hitler's view of the world, it revealed 
much about the man. Hitler did not have the character needed 
to be the ruler of a great country. He was uncouth and 
illfitted for the role. "Rarely indeed can one aspiring to 
leadership so blatantly have dubbed himself an ignorant 
barbarian.,,13 
Hitler was a "barbarian." This explained much of his 
behavior and his fellow Nazis' actions. In the process of 
taking control of the government in 1933, Hitler overthrew 
much of what Th Nation valued in western civilization. The 
weekly reacted to these Nazi atrocities toward humanity with 
an almost palpable passion, rarely written with such 
eloquence in Western journalism. 
It is to be noted that an attack of unrivaled strength 
and ferocity is being launched against the life of the 
mind as such, against all intellectual values, against 
all disinterestedness of thought, of research, of 
aspiration, against the slowly won rights of the human 
spirit and the freely functioning personality, against 
every principle and every truth and every freedom that 
men have lived for and often died for since the 
Renaissance, against all that has constity~ed for so 
long the very charter of humanity itself. 
The "barbarians of the north" were perpetrating 
these terrible crimes against humanity; what The Nation 
valued in western culture was being destroyed. To uphold its 
suppositions, the weekly quoted frequently from Hitler's 
13 Ibid . 
14Ludwig Lewisohn, "The New Kultur," The Nation 136 
(June 21, 1933):696. 
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autobiography. The evidence in his book revealed he would 
purposely lie if it suited his purposes. The Nation 
paraphrased Hitler's words in Mein Kampf to his followers, 
"quite plainly in order to achieve power they are justified 
in deceiving the German people and employing every form of 
lSviolence." Hitler's government lied about many issues, The 
Nation insisted, by far the worst duplicity, on Hitler's 
part, was over the Jewish question. 16 His government 
consistently denied that Jews were being physically abused 
or that their businesses were being confiscated and 
destroyed by German agents. The government also attempted to 
disassociate itself from any unpleasant incidents that 
occurred during the early days of the Nazi regime. Jewish 
survivors of atrocities committed in Germany were 
interviewed by The Nation's reporters. In every single 
instance, they reported, violence was committed by organized 
17bands of Nazis, and usually they were acting under orders. 
The Nazi government "issues denials, punishes Jews for 
spreading atrocity stories, expels honest correspondents, 
and continues to encourage the very violence and 
ISphilip S. Bernstein, "Can Hitler Be Trusted?," e 
Nation 137 (December 27, 1933):728. 
16 Ibid . 
17Richard Neuberger, "The New Germany," The Nation 
137 (October 4, 1933):376-79. and Philip S. Bernstein, "Can 
Hitler Be Trusted?," p. 728. 
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confiscation it is denying. fl18 Nurder, beatings, boycotts, 
and confiscation of property continued in the Third Reich. 
Apparently, Hitler learned he could not openly destroy a 
minority without enraging world opinion. Instead, he 
proceeded to crush the Jews and at the same time pacify 
world opinion with his ludicrous denials. 
Although the denial of atrocities committed against 
Jews was part of Hitler's dishonesty, another side of his 
duplicity became clear to The Nation after the Third Reich 
began to fulfill its pan-Germanic policy. Hitler lied 
repeatedly to the leaders of other nations about his 
intentions toward the rest of Europe. He was not reliable; 
his word had no credibility. Hitler was completely 
"ruthless, and thinks no more of breaking a promise than he 
would of breaking a kitten's back. All his moves are 
calculated to achieve his objectives, and he is entirely 
devoid of scruples.,,19 Hitler would lie to achieve his 
goals, and he did so again and again. The Nation deplored 
the attitudes and conduct of Hitler, in particular as he was 
the leader of Germany. At times, the journal would vacillate 
between hope that Hitler's actions would be minimized by 
others, and acceptance of the consequences of his nature. 
18philip S. Bernstein, "Can Hitler Be Trusted?," 
p.72S. 
19 paul Y. Anderson, "It's All in 'Mein Kampf'," The 
Nation 147 (October 8, 1938):343. 
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This, to the contrary, did not mean that the journal 
underestimated Hitler in any way.20 As early as 1934, The 
Nation expressed the opinion that even though Hitler was not 
what he seemed at times and that he was illiterate, he was 
not an idiot or fool and no other group controlled him. 
Many people, during the first couple of years of 
Nazi rule in Germany, believed Hitler was the dupe of one 
group or another. If it was not the industrialists, then it 
was the military command of Germany that controlled Hitler. 
The Nation did not support either view. The most serious 
supposition was that Hitler was commanded by the army or 
that the Reichswehr would eventually overthrow him. "And I 
am convinced that it is an illusion to count on the 
overthrow of Hitler by the Reichswehr, and a mistake to 
suppose that he in under the domination of the military 
command.,,21 The military command probably needed Hitler more 
than Hitler needed it. Even though the winter of 1934 was 
evidently going to be a perilous one -with shortages of both 
food and fuel--most Germans still supported Hitler. The 
FUhrer was capable of this domination. "Hitler is really, 
not merely nominally, the complete master of Germany and is 
still the demi-god of the great majority of the German 
20Louis Fischer, "Fascism and Bolshevism," The 
Nation 138 (April 4, 1934):381. 
21 
Robert Dell, flThe Future of Hitler," The Nation  
139 (September 19, 1934):321.  
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people.,,22 The military command must have been cognizant of 
this situation. The Nation's assessment of Hitler's mastery 
of the Reichswehr came before the evidence fully supported 
its supposition, as the army, later in 1938, was required to 
swear allegiance to Hitler alone. Was any of the Nazi 
leadership better than Hitler? The Nation discovered they 
were as bad as Hitler. 
The weekly had another source in its formation of 
its opinion of Hitler and Nazism. It examined the rest of 
the Nazi leaders for abilities to lead and command. One 
could almost expect what The Nation believed these 
"destroyers of Humanity," the Nazis, were like. The journal 
did not mince words in its evaluation. "It is a horrifying 
fact that Germany today is ruled by men of a type such as 
have never before governed a great nation: drug addicts, 
23murderers, thieves, forgers, and moral decedents." One 
would think The Nation must be describing hooligans off the 
street rather than the leaders of a prominent European 
government. According to The Nation, these were not mere 
words of abuse, these were terms that it asserted "describe 
the commonly recognized character of most of the chief 
leaders of the movement.,,24 
22 Ibid .  
23Harrison Brown, "Six Months of Hitlerism," p. 124.  
24 Ibid .  
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Most of the men, who followed Hitler, had lived on 
the fringes of society after the war "exercising the only 
trade they knew, hell-raising as outlaws. .,,25 The 
Nation did not hesitate to delve into their characters just 
as it did with Hitler. Many of Hitler's cohorts were 
military men, remnants of the war. Though some had not 
served with the military, all were products of that era. 
Hermann GHring, Aviation Minister of the Reich, had been a 
war ace in the last war. However, this did not speak well 
for GHring because "he is, like RHhm, accused of a secret 
vice, morphinism, which, impressive documents are adduced to 
show, once confined him in an asylum. ,,26 Many of his 
other vices were well-known, including his liking of the 
sumptuous life style. Ernst RHhm was leader of the SA 
division of the Brown Army and Reich Minister without 
portfolio. RHhm's drug addiction was notorious and so were 
his sexual exploits with boys. Dr. ul Josef Goebbles, 
Propaganda Minister, "is no longer a man. He is a titan, a 
god. His detractors are in jail and his play is performed, 
to empty houses but to the frenzied applause of all 
surviving drama critics.,,27 ny of the critics who 
criticized Goebbles novel, Mi were interred in prison 
25 Mlrlam " Bear d , "Who's Who in Nazidom," T e Nation 
138 (May 2, 1934):501.· 
26 Ibid ., p. 502. 
27 Ibid ., p. 503. 
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for their honesty. Several other Nazi faithful were rewarded 
guardianship of the "new Germanic soul." For example, the 
German Labor Front Hinister, Dr. Ley was "a notorious rowdy 
and drunkard, condemned once by regular courts for 
28assault." Many Nazi leaders, mentioned by Th Nation, had 
been tried for crimes of violence and a few were implicated 
in murders. This was not a group of highly respected 
citizens leading the new state. These were men the world 
could not respect and, thus, support. In short, "the Nazis 
are friends neither to peace nor to organized 
society. .,,29 The character of the Nazi leadership 
definitely betrayed what the National Socialist movement was 
all about. If the followers of Hitler shared equally with 
the FUhrer in responsibility, what of the German people 
themselves? What were the attitudes of Th Nation toward 
them? Were the German people responsible and for what 
reasons were they willing to accept Hitler? 
clearly believed the ready acceptance ofTh 
Hitler by the people of Germany revealed faults in their 
national character. Hitler was successful because "the 
Germans, always victims of an inferiority complex and always 
stirred because the rest of the world will not accept them 
at their own valuation as the greatest of all 
28 Ibid .  
29 Ibid ., p.504.  
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,,30 H' Inations. . It er was well aware that these feelings 
existed in the German people and they were "ready to believe 
anyone who plays up to their national prejudices and tells 
them what they wish to hear about their terrible 
maltreatment.,,3l Hitler!s success with the Nazi movement was 
undoubtedly due to something in the German subconscious. 
Hitler was convinced that race decides the national 
character of a people. Race does not determine national 
character, according to T ion, but other factors do. 
National history, environment, climate, upbringing, 
institutions, and other causes are responsible for the 
formation of national character. 32 Of course not everyone 
shares in the same characteristics, but enough people must 
for a national character to exist. 
The N tion explained about the German national 
characteristics that were their undoing in both 1914 and 
1939. "In Germany an important factor has been the bad 
influence of certain German philosophers, notably Hegel and 
Fichte.,,33 The journal went on to single out the German 
300swald Garrison Villard, "Issues and Hen: The Nazi 
Child-Mind," p. 614. 
3l Ibid . 
32Robert Dell, "The Menace of a United Germany," 
Nation 149 (December 23, 1939):704. 
33 Ibid . 
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characteristics that got them into trouble in 1914 as well 
as 1939. 
Among the chief German national characteristics are an 
inferiority complex, a craving for a FUhrer, and an 
abnormal lack of common sense, which means a lack of 
political sense. • The unification of Germany in 
1871 intensified the faults of the German character and 
converted Germany into a huge machine which crushed 
~h~t~ve: in§~pendence there was and destroyed individual 
lnltlatlve. 
A combination of German character flaws, along with 
the economic conditions in 1933 and the subsequent actions 
of both France and England, brought the Nazi movement to 
success in their bid for power. However, The Nation's 
position was that none of what happened in Germany after 
1933 would have been possible, regardless of other 
circumstances, without the national characteristics of an 
inferiority complex, a need for strong leadership, and an 
inability, on the people's part, to see the political 
consequences of their actions. 
Hitler commanded an abject following. T e Nation 
clearly thought little of Hitler as a person and as the 
leader of Germany. It deplored his conduct and condemned his 
views. Hitler's goals and aspirations, first to control 
Germany and then Europe, destroyed all German freedoms. T 
Xation held these freedoms to be essential for humanity. 
With the destruction of German liberties, Hitler crushed the 
soul and character of the German nation. Other Nazi leaders 
34 Ibid . 
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did not add to an acceptable picture of leadership in 
Germany. The German people shared some responsibility, their 
national character flaws allowed them to either accept or 
support Hitler. The deplorable Nazi character disrupted 
German life and the resultant consequences not only 
devastated personal liberties but racial minorities and 
dissident views as well. 
CHAPTER III  
NAZI ABUSES OF JEWS, GERMANS, AND THE  
DESTRUCTION OF GERMAN CULTURE  
The Nation was concerned with the abuses the German 
people were suffering at the hands of the Nazis. From the 
time the Nazis gained control of the German government in 
1933, basic freedoms were outlawed. Hitler smashed all 
opposition through either legal measures or violent 
suppression. Anti-Jewish laws were instituted as well as 
laws that affected most political groups. As a result, many 
people lost the right to their livelihood. Aryans were not 
allowed to buy in Jewish businesses and forms of repression 
were used. A world boycott of German goods caused the Nazis 
to try to cover up their persecution, but The Nation 
continued its expose~ Many others, in addition to the 
minorities, were persecuted by the Third Reich. The whole of 
German culture was altered by the National Socialists. 
Practitioners of the arts, educators, and scientists, were 
either driven from Germany, subjected to repressive laws and 
actions, or were humiliated by the new German order. In 
addition, women also suffered under the Third Reich as their 
earning power and status in German society were altered by 
the Nazis! attitudes toward them. 
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Once Hitler's foreign policy aspirations became 
clear to The Nation, its fears extended beyond Germany to 
the other peoples of Europe. What happened to the oppressed 
Germans could happen to others. Freedoms that Americans take 
for granted and are, also, the backbone of liberalism, were 
outlawed by Hitler's regime. Free speech, freedom of the 
press, equal employment opportunities, freedom from racial 
and religious discrimination, and the right to vote were all 
suppressed by the Nazis. Not only were freedoms eliminated, 
but several groups of people were singled out by the Nazis 
for persecution and "special treatment." Hitler believed he 
had to destroy all opposition to insure his complete mastery 
of Germany. In order to do this, Hitler eliminated all 
political groups and persecuted other various people. But 
Nazi action affected more than just the groups they believed 
were their opponents; members of racial groups were chosen 
for persecution and destruction in addition. The persecuted, 
therefore, included, "liberals, Socialists, Communists, Jews 
or Catholics. 
In 1933, persecution of the various people in 
Germany took two basic forms: legal repression and physical 
abuse which sometimes went as far as death. Political groups 
were outlawed by Nazi promulgation in 1933 and Jews were 
denied equal status under the law. As early as 1933, 
l"Nazis Against the \vorld," The Nation 136 (April 5, 
1933):361. 
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advocated a loosening of American immigration laws to 
"facilitate the granting of visas • . to permit the entry 
of the German victims of political persecution.,,2 It has 
been an American tradition to grant asylum to the persecuted 
peoples of the world. This was to become a recurrent theme 
for The Nation. 
Persecution of the Jews began in 1933. The pogroms 
exposed by the weekly were, however, only a foreshadowing of 
what was to corne for the Jews in Germany and Europe under 
Nazi rule. Jewish people suffered many losses under Nazi 
subjugation. They were forced into ghettos and were the 
worst treated in concentration camps. They lost their 
property, businesses, and livelihood. Also, Jews lost their 
lives as Nazi suppression was extremely brutal. The Nation 
believed the anti-Semitic policy, pursued by the German 
fascists, was a direct result of Hitler's personal hatreds. 
Due to the persecution and pogroms of the Nazis, 
many Jews, not yet aware that other countries would not 
allow them to immigrate, would try to leave Germany. Escape, 
however, became difficult for German Jews because in 1933 
the Nazis instituted a sichtverrnerk or special visa which 
was needed to leave the country and was required on all 
passports. This special visa was Honly granted to 
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'Aryans' .,,3 As a consequence, many Jews were trapped inside 
German borders and a dismal future awaited them. 
The Nation recognized the Jews as being the most 
severely persecuted under Nazi oppression. No American could 
"imagine the pathological bloodthirstiness of the Nazi anti-
Semitic campaign. . The moral tone and flavor of this 
whole movement is grossly pathologica1.,,4 All human and 
civil rights for the Jews were eradicated by Hitler. 
Anathema to the liberal principles held by The Na was 
the elimination of basic human rights. This was the worst 
kind of oppression to the journal. "No one, Jew, or non-Jel;l, 
has any recourse in law against any aggression or any 
cruelty, expropriation, imprisonment, or execution."S There 
were many other forms of mistreatment devised by the Nazis. 
The German fascists were going to deny all the civil rights 
of their alleged enemies. 
Not only were the Jews harassed out of their 
professions, but by "law no municipal or federal employee 
[was] allowed to buy in a Jewish store.,,6 All Jewish stores 
were picketed and potential customers were hounded by the SA 
3Letter, "Escaping the German Hell," Nation 136 
(April 26, 1933):470. 
4Ludwig Le\visohn, "Germany's Lowest Depths," The 
Nat ion 136 01a y 3, 1933): 493. 
5 Ibid . 
6"The Nazi Hexxenkessel--A Letter," T Nation 137 
(September 6, 1933):269. 
35  
and other uniformed Nazis. Another format available in the 
Nazi arsenal of assault was the weekly paper, the StUrmer. 
The German weekly had a large circulation, and in every 
large town it was posted publicly for any to read. The paper 
claimed to be dedicated to the battle for truth, and it 
"stresses every week in large roman type that 'Jews Are Our 
Misfortune' .,,7 If an Aryan slipped up, forgot, and bought 
from Jews, the StUrmer was sure to report it to the public. 
"It is a shame when two hereditary peasants, Georg Heinrich 
Sassmannshausen and Heinrich Dreisbach, both from 
Birkenfield, do business with the notorious Talmud Jew and 
Nazi hater, Simon from ErndtebrUck.,,8 This is an example of 
the kind of article run by the weekly paper. The Nation 
reported that Germans were named in this publication and 
then were subject to persecution for patronizing Jewish 
establishments. This was a highly effective tool of 
repression. 
Much of the extreme treatment of the Jews in the 
first six months of the Nazi regime was given worldwide 
publicity. As a result, world opinion created a boycott 
against the Nazis which affected their pogroms in 1933. It 
might appear, according to The ation, as if persecution had 
ended as a result of the boycott. But this was not so, 
7Heinrich L. Schiller, "Prize Journalism Under 
Hitler," The Nation 141 (July 3, 1935):12. 
8 Ibid ., p.13. 
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insisted a reporter who made a trip to the hamlets, 
villages, and areas that were less well-travelled by 
tourists. He saw treatment contrary to Nazi claims. 
"Everywhere I saw evidence of cruelty, violence, and 
death.,,9 This reporter had many experiences with the terror 
in Nazi Germany. One example should be sufficient to convey 
the horror he felt. Two Jewish girls were taken by the 
Nazis, stripped, beaten, raped, and left for dead in a 
meadow. The families feared for these girls' lives because 
they survived their torture and, as a consequence of their 
families' fear, were subsequently smuggled into Switzerland. 
This kind of savagery and even worse was rampant in Germany. 
Physical abuse, as well as other kinds of harassment, took a 
toll. "Socially and economically, as well as politically, 
the Jews have been ruined. Those who have not suffered 
physical violence are experiencing mental torture almost as 
severe. ,,10 The Nation was one of the fe\'l publications in the 
U.S. that printed the truth about the persistent Nazi 
hostility and brutality toward the Jews. ~ost of the 
American press relied upon German sources for information 
regarding the treatment of the Jews in Germany and 
elsewhere. II The weekly printed a letter from a German woman 
9Richard Neuberger, "The New Germany," p. 377. 
IOIbid., p. 378. 
11 Sara Alpern, Freda Kirchwey: A Woman of The 
Nation, p. 114. 
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who complained of the "gullibility" of Americans in their 
12acceptance of Nazi lies as the truth. 
In 1936, the Nazis began one of the greatest anti-
Jewish drives, "probably the last and greatest of them 
all.,,13 This was only a foretaste of what was to come, 
according to Th Nation. Ghettos were established in Germany 
by the promulgation of the Nilrnberg Laws on the fourteenth 
of September. These laws took away the final vestiges of 
Jewish economic independence. Many people, including some 
Jews, believed the creation of the Ghettos would bring 
respite for the Jewish people. Even though they would be 
denied their freedom of movement, it was assumed that they 
would, at least, be free from anxiety and have some 
assurance of their future. Such beliefs were ludicrous in 
the face of previous evidence and were doomed to disappoint 
those who looked optimistically upon the NUrnberg Laws. The 
believed the Jews and others were grasping at 
14straws. This law only legalized the current state of 
pogroms, boycotts, and other harsh treatment that existed in 
Germany prior to 1936. 
12"The Nazi Hexxenkessel--A Personal Letter," p. 
269. 
13\.Jilliam Zuckerman, "Where the German Ghetto 
Leads," 	The Nati n 142 (February 5, 1936):155. 
14 Ibid ., pp. 154-55. 
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As part of the The Nation's compilation of inhuman 
treatment, in 1936, also, came the revelation that Jews were 
the worst treated prisoners in the Nazi concentration camps. 
A prisoner, who survived the ordeal, told of the different 
groups confined in the camps. Criminals, Austrians, 
political prisoners, critics, and religious fanatics were 
included in the groups imprisoned by the Nazis. Among these 
various people the Jews were "the worst-treated prisoners. 
All occupations in the workshops [were] forbidden 
them. .,dS The Jews had to perform all the hard, dirty 
work. The graves in the cemetery proved how hard it was for 
the Jews. The Jewish people, in other nations, were not 
going to be any safer from the ravages of Nazism than they 
were in Germany. 
The fate of the Austrian Jews was, virtually, the 
same as that of the Jews in Germany. Only five months after 
the German Anschluss with Austria, 20,000 Jews were either 
arrested or placed in concentration camps. Jewish property 
and savings were confiscated and the people theMselves were 
subject to "the grossest physical indignities.,,16 The "cold 
pogroms" \.ere, basically, economic and their aim was to 
drive the Jewish businessmen from the Reich. No one was 
lSJohann Schmidt, "Sojourn in Hell," The Nation 143 
(September 12, 1936):301. 
16William E. Dodd, "Germany Shocked Me," The n 
147 (August 20, 1938):176. 
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allowed to buy from Jewish merchants, and if anyone did, 
they were, in turn, persecuted as in Germany. 
The ~ation feared the confiscation and closure of 
Jewish businesses in Germany threatened the Jews in a vital 
area. Other than the physical abuse, certainly, the gravest 
consequence for the Jews was their exclusion from earning a 
wage. In 1937, the weekly lamented that 75 per cent of all 
Jews who held positions in 1933 had been dismissed. The 
17remaining 25 per cent were chiefly employed by other Jews. 
Not only were Jewish people denied employment, but education 
was denied to them, also. Jews could not join the army or go 
to labor camp. In 1937, there were still 375,000 Jews in 
Germany. Of this number, 100,000 were dependent for their 
support upon Jewish charitable agencies and another 100,000 
were supported by their relatives. It was also reported by 
The Nation that every Jewish family that still had income 
supported three other Jewish families. 
The Nation was concerned with what had happened to 
225,000 Jews as in 1933, there had been approximately 
600,000 Jews in Germany, and the number dwindled to 375,000 
during the next four years. It was estimated that 125,000 
left the country either before the restrictions or secretly 
escaped from Germany, The rest of the Jews were dead 
(100,000). Many were either killed by the Nazis or died from 
17philip S, Bernstein, "The Fate of German Jews," 
The 145 (October 23, 1937):423. 
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causes attributable to the German fascists. No one living 
under these circumstances would want to have children; as a 
result, the death rate greatly outpaced the birth rate among 
the Jews. The Nation, therefore, concluded that "the Nazi 
assault upon the German Jews moves on from segregation to 
pauperization, to emigration [if possible], to 
annihilation.,,18 In fact, the only choice left for the Jews 
was either emigration or death. This was a very chilling 
forecast of the future. 
In the face of these horrors, The Nation asked where 
this state wide anti Semitic policy originated and what were 
the causes? The weekly believed it had an answer. "It all 
stems from Hitler and from the philosophy explicitly stated 
in his book 'Mein Kampf'. ,,19 The Nazis believed the Jewish 
people were the reason or explanation for a prostrate and 
humiliated post-war Germany. How else could the Aryan race 
have failed to win the war? If Hitler has his way, "by 1950 
no Jew will be living within the boundaries of Germany, that 
they all will have been killed or driven into exile.,,20 
Although The Nation knew anti-Semitism was prevalent 
throughout Germany and the rest of Europe, only the Nazis 
18 Ibid ., p. 425.  
19iHlliam E. Dodd, "Germany Shocked He," p. 178.  
20 Ibid .  
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and their extreme hostilities could have fostered the 
fanatical policies of the Third Reich. 
The Nation kept up a persistent appeal for worldwide 
aid for the Jews. Their alternative was extremely bleak if 
no aid was forthcoming. "The house of the Jews in Central 
Europe is aflame, and arson is the deliberate policy of 
fascism. ,,21 Host nations, however, refused to open up their 
immigration policies to enable the refugees of Europe to 
have a place of safety. This refusal of help was followed by 
The Nation's condemnation, which included the United States. 
Americans did little to change Roosevelt's policy of not 
increasing the American quota. The weekly, in no uncertain 
terms, blar.Jed the Ar.Jerican people. "Behind this [the lack of 
change] lies the distressing apathy of the American people 
,,22 Theas a whole to the plight of the refugees. 
weekly asserted every means should be explored for getting 
the victims of Nazi persecutions saved from certain death. 
This was not just a Jewish problem or a European one. 
Because the people of the United States were part of a 
worldwide community, Americans had to fight against this 
kind of Nazi oppression and deal with the resultant anguish. 
In particular, Americans must care about basic rights being 
subverted by the Nazis. "It is the fight of everyone who 
21"Death Trap for Jews," The Nation 147 (July 16, 
1938):61. 
22 Ibid . 
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believes in personal liberty and civil rights, a fight for 
the principles on which America was founded.,,23 There was a 
general consensus, at the journal, that this was the duty of 
Americans. 
The Nation, frustrated by the lack of caring and 
response and because it was concerned for the Jews in 
Europe, continued its plea for help. The petition for 
assistance from other countries was again repeated as the 
savage attacks on Jews had not abated. For example, the 
anniversary of the Armistice in Germany in 1938 was 
celebrated by the Nazi youths' destruction of Jewish 
property. Their homes, shops, and synagogues were plundered 
and burned. Thousands of Jews were beaten and arrested while 
police and firemen looked on. "Never were mass cowardice, 
mass brutality, and mass destruction so gruesomely 
displayed.,,24 The governments of the world must develop a 
refugee program to rescue the displaced of Europe. No longer 
could Americans deny their duty and heritage. This was an 
appeal for a "revival of the spirit that made the right of 
asylum a genuine part of our legacy of democratic 
ideas. ,,25 The fascists had thrown a gauntlet at the 
23Richard Neuberger, "The New Germany," p. 379. 
24Editorial, "\tlar Against the Jews," The Nation 147 
(November 19, 1938):524. 
25Freda Kirchwey, "Jews and Refugees," (Editorial) 
Nation 148 (May 20, 1937):577. 
43  
feet of the American people according to The • "If we.;;.;...;;;-"-......;;;..;;.;;. 
refuse to pick it up or pretend we don't see it, we shall 
have agreed in advance to the annihilation of every decent 
and humane value in life and have given Hitler his greatest 
bloodless victory.,,26 The weekly supported the liberal 
belief that every non-fascist nation was, in some way, 
responsible for the fate of the European refugees. These 
countries had a responsibility to perform. The United 
States, in the forefront of the democracies, had a special 
duty which was held in common with the American heritage for 
providing asylum from any form of persecution. Not only did 
Nazi persecution affect the minorities, but every part of 
German culture was also touched by the new order. Oppression 
took a peculiar, but effective, form in Nazi Germany. All 
groups guilty of mental, economic, or political heresy were 
denied the basic right to livelihood. The government 
impounded savings, positions were denied to the oppressed, 
and those "who have not accepted the Nazi political and 
economic religion are doomed to starvation.,,27 
Americans should not only be concerned about the 
Jewish people, but as additional areas of German life came 
under Nazi attack, their concern must be for others, also. 
The free trade unions were suppressed in 1933, and many 
26 Ibid . 
27Editorial, "Back to Barbarism," The Nation 136 
(April 12, 1933):388. 
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workers, including union leaders, were thrown into 
concentration camps. In areas allover Germany, another 
reporter met men who were lucky to outlive the camps as most 
did not. Many survivors were either deaf and or gruesomely 
the l~mang 1 e d f rom varlOUS" tortures d eVlse" d by hl azl"S.28 
Instead of their free trade unions, the workers were 
compelled to join the Membership was 
mandatory in the Nazi worker's union and so was attendance 
at meetings. This was another method used by the Nazis to 
control and subjugate the German people, especially those 
whom were highly suspect, and the workers certainly were. 
Workers were under suspicion because, in general, they had 
been members of the labor parties and the Social Democratic 
Party, and as a consequence, the Nazis believed they 
warranted serveillance. Many Germans had not originally 
supported Hitler; therefore, many people were suspected by 
the Nazis. 
Regardless of what the National Socialists reported, 
they certainly were aware that they did not have the 
complete support of the German people. The Nazis knew, for 
their dominance to be complete, all German citizens had to 
be under some form of Nazi authority. Almost all Germans 
were forced into Nazi controlled organizations. ~ith workers 
it was the Arbeitsfr nt and with German young people the 
28Evelyn Lawrence, "The Hitler Terror Mounts," The 
Nation 139 (September 5, 1934):261. 
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form of manipulation and molding was, primarily, the Hitler 
Youth. The Nazis needed to master a whole nation and to do 
so Hitler had to subvert German law. For the Nazis to gain 
complete mastery of Germany, they altered German criminal 
law and the courts. The Penal Code Amendment Law went into 
effect on September I, 1935 and The Nation believed the law 
would have far reaching impact. "The law codifies Nazi lynch 
justice, divorces jurisprudence from impartiality and makes 
the National Socialist Weltanschauung [creed or philosophy 
of life] the guiding star of criminal trials.,,29 The 
revolution in German law was to be accomplished by requiring 
the judges' subservience to Nazi ideology. They were to 
respond to Nazi wishes. If the jurists did not do so, then 
they would be called to order by the State Attorney who was, 
obviously, a National Socialist. 
No law had to be disobeyed for a crime to have been 
committed, only Nazi Weltanschauung need be violated. The 
new Nazi statute called for conviction and punishment to be 
based on "sound public sentiment." In other words, "'[iJf no 
definite criminal law applies to the deed, it must be 
punished in accordance with the law the basic ideas of which 
best fit it' .,,30 According to The Nation, this new law put 
the complete control of German citizens into Nazi hands. If 
29 Emil Lengyel, "Germany Codifies Lynch Law," The 
Nation 141 (September 4, 1935):263. 
30 Ibid . 
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Germans did not conform to Xazi ideology, they were tried as 
criminals, convicted, thrown into jailor executed. The 
journal believed Nazi law cast a pall over German 
jurisprudence. "[U]nder the new [law] he may be found guilty 
even if he has broken no law fitting the case. The new law, 
in short, gives the Nazi state the legal means to crush 
political opposition of every imaginable kind.,,31 And not 
just political opposition, but Jewish and "Aryan" marriages, 
for example, were outlawed by the application of 
Weltanschauung. This was the kind of tyranny the Nazi law 
led to. Furthermore, the Nazi's ideology was to have even 
more far-reaching affect on the Jews. 
In the process of dominating Germany and changing 
the laws to reflect Xazi ideology, the best of the Republic 
was to be replaced by a Germanic culture which would unite 
"racial intolerance with a blind and aggressive nationalism 
[and] all achievement, all leadership, all organization are 
to be according to the racial reinterpretation of history, 
artei .,,32 Hitler's reinterpretation of 
German society would affect Germany in many painful and 
disruptive ways. Oppression, one of the tools used by the 
Nazis to restructure all of German society, was not solely 
physical in nature according to The Nation. It could include 
31 Ibid • 
32Ludwig Lore, "The Nazi Revolution at \vork," p. 442 
and Ludwig Lewisohn, "The New Kultur," p. 695, 
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emotional trauma as well as physical violence. Germans saw 
their scientists, writers, educators, and other 
intellectuals either interred or forced to flee into exile 
from Germany. Education, theatre, film, written materials, 
all marks of culture, were altered by contact with Hitler 
and the Nazis. Women, and their roles in society, were 
redefined in connection with Nazi constraints. The freedom 
to participate in German culture, as it was before the Nazis 
came to power, was an essential liberty which was denied by 
the Nazis according to The Nation. 
Two months after Hitler came to power in 1933, the 
"government has swept like a devastating storm over creative 
,,33 A. •• • d' .Germany. . troc~t~es were comm~tte aga~nst persons ~n 
every creative field. Practitioners of the arts, letters, 
sciences, and all cultural fields had not escaped the Nazi 
wrath. h Nation understood that these acts by the Nazis 
were not uncontrolled passions released by their revolution. 
"They are part of a definite, carefully planned program of 
relentless persecution against those who refuse to accept 
the National Socialist super national philosophy, or who, 
because of race or creed, have incurred the hatred of the 
present rulers.,,34 Hore than a hundred actors were excluded 
from the stage in Germany. All managers and directors of 
33Ludwig Lore, "The Nazi Revolution at Hork," p. 
442. 
34 Ibid . 
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theatres and opera houses were replaced by Nazis of dubious 
talent. Liberal and radical writers were driven from 
Germany. Among their ranks were writers such as, Thomas Mann 
and Heinreich Mann. Modern architects, city physicians, and 
editors of magazines and newspapers were asked to resign or 
were arrested by the Nazis. The National Socialists 
rejected, as false, all aspects of German intellectual 
culture achieved by the Second Reich and the Weimar 
Republic. The Nazis discarded all parts of the Weimar 
culture, which The _N...:;.;..;;....;;;;...::....=n described as "the true torch 
bearers of civilization in Germany. • ,,35 Instead, the 
Nazis retained and exalted "the worst aspects of Prussianism 
,,36and Kaiserism. 
Many Germans were displaced, arrested, left without 
work, or were forced into exile because of the Nazi 
revolution which began in 1933. The areas of German life 
affected and the list of professions altered by the Nazis 
are too numerous to include in their entirety in this paper. 
Therefore, one area of German intellectual life will be 
examined, in more detail, to reveal the extent of the 
devastation portrayed by Th Nation in its pages. The 
universities were hard hit by the Nazi intent to restructure 
German culture. The theoretical basis of Nazi culture was 
35 Emil Lengyel, "German Culture in Exile," 
Nation 136 (May 31, 1933):607. 
36 Ibid . 
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found in Ernst Krick's book: The N tional Socialist 
Education. Krick's book rapidly became the Bible of Nazi 
teachers. An example of Nazi theory: "'The Age of pure 
reason and of unprejudiced free science is over'. 
The bemoaned the fact that Krick was the foundation 
of Nazi education. No longer would free thinking be allowed 
by the Nazis. Only National Socialist dogma was acceptable 
as the source of subject material in the schools of the 
Third Reich. Teachers had to submit to the Nazis. "The Third 
Reich glories in the suppression of individuality, and the 
ideal of the community must be the 'volkisches Mensch,' the 
'race man' bare of personal traits, subordinating his 
knowledge and will to the Fatherland.,,38 Obviously some 
professors would have difficulty subordinating their 
"knowledge and will to the Fatherland." By May 1933, 250 
professors were known to have been dismissed from their 
posts in German universities. According to The N t n, the 
reasons for dismissal were shaped by the Nazi desire to 
purge the universities of undesirables. Of the number 
deprived of their appointments, 40 per cent were known to be 
Jewish and the rest were liberals and pacifists. Many more 
professors, though the numbers were uncertain, resigned 
their positions in protest to Nazi action. Nazi student 
37 Ibid .  
38 Ibid .  
so 
corporations issued "certificates of confidence" to 
professors whose political beliefs they supported. Nazi 
students also boycotted those lectures of professors known 
to possess political beliefs contrary to Nazi dogma. In 
Prussia alone, more than thirty non-Aryan and Marxist 
d · . d f . 39pro f essors were lsmlsse b ecause 0 stu d ent lnstlgatlon.. . 
Nazi student agitation did not effect only male professors. 
Female professors were devastated by the German fascists. 
The most thorough cleansing process in German 
universities, was with the dismissal of women professors; 
they were all purged from their positions. The Nation was 
concerned because of all the women in Germany, other than 
Jewish women, the hardest hit by the hatred of the Weimar 
culture were women intellectuals. These women not only had 
their livelihood snatched from them, but also, their whole 
lives invalidated, "for in The Third Reich there is no place 
for intellect and, outside of the kitchen no place for 
women." 40 Examples of women's treatment in the first two 
Reichs greatly influenced official Nazi policy for The Third 
Reich. Women in Barbarossa's First Reich were little more 
than chattel. From the Second Reich came the official Nazi 
policy toward women. Their policy is probably best defined 
39 Ibid .• pp. 607-08.  
40 Ibid ., p. 608.  
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by Wilhelm II's own words: "'Kirche, Klichen, Kinder' .,,41 
This belief, although it found expression in the Second 
Reich. was not the official policy. Beyond the realm of this 
womanly domain--the church, kitchen, and children--women in 
Nazi Germany were not expected to contribute to their 
country in any other form whatsoever. A prime example of how 
this anti-women Nazi dogma affected women professors was 
given by T e Nation. German sociologist, Mathilde Vaerting 
was a prominent faculty member at a prestigious German 
university. In particular, the Nazis renounced her research 
which set out to prove that men's dominance of women was 
based on sociological rather than biological factors. 
Vaerting's intellect was not considered worthy of the state. 
Her continued presence at a university belied the Nazi 
doctrine that all women should contribute to the state by 
remaining at home and bearing children. Professor Vaerting 
was fired. "Her dismissal is the most striking overt act so 
far committed in the Nazi war against the freedom of 
women.,,42 
These stringent restrictions did not apply equally, 
across the board, to women. The intentions of the Nazis were 
there, but it did not work out that way for them. By a law 
passed on June 1, 1933, Hitler intended to relieve 
4l Ibid •  
42 Ed · . ltorla I , The Nation 137 (August 16, 1933):171. 
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unemployment by eliminating women workers. Was Hitler's 
policy successful and did the women benefit from the 
consequences? To begin with, women workers were not 
eliminated from holding jobs. In 1936, there were 5,470,000 
women employed in Germany. There were 1,200,000 more women 
working in 1937 than in 1932, before Hitler. Women accounted 
for 31 per cent of the German labor force. More women were 
43working in Germany than in either England or France. 
Even with women working in increasing numbers, were 
women workers secure in their positions and had Nazi 
directives benefited them? These questions were of real 
concern to The Nati . It answered no to both of these 
inquiries. liThe vigorous campaign against the employment of 
women has not led to their increased domesticity and 
security, but has been effective in squeezing them out of 
the better-paid positions into the sweated trades.,,44 Not 
only were women forced into the sweated trades for lower 
wages, but women workers, in general, lost real income from 
1933 to 1937. This, also, happened to employed men, but 
women lost more in comparison. (See Chapter IV for the 
details on what happened to male workers.) In 1937, the 
average male worker earned a net of $11 to $12 per week. The 
average weekly wage for a female worker was $6 to $8. For 
43Judith Gruenfeld, "Women Workers in Nazi Germany,1I 
The Nation 144 (March 13, 1937):295. 
44 Ibid • 
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example, in the typographical trades, hourly earnings of 
women employees was 48.4 per cent lower than the rates for 
men. A comparison of these statistics to those of 1931 or 
1932 reveals women's average income had dropped more than 
the men's income. 45 Because women were paid much less than 
men, it was easier for them to find employment and the 
process of lowering their rates was continued. 
So much for women being eliminated from their 
employment by the Nazis' policy and law. In fact, Germany 
was dependent upon the labor of women workers because there 
was a shortage of male workers in Germany. Of the total 17.6 
million German workers, 13.7 million were male workers. Even 
if every available male worker was employed, there would 
have been a shortage of 4.4 million workers. Women workers 
were, consequently, essential to German production of export 
commodities and the rearmament industry. 
Did women benefit from their necessity in labor? Not 
according to The Nation. They generally worked in more 
dangerous and demeaning positions with longer, exhausting 
hours. Women, also, made less money than they did prior to 
Hitler. German women were worse off than were women in other 
parts of Europe. "Cultural progress tends to eliminate hard 
work for women and to facilitate their ascent to higher 
45 Ibid . 
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professions. Fascism reverses this process.,,46 Although 
women intellectuals lost the most, their professions as well 
as their sense of worth, in fascist Germany, women of lower 
classes were affected in far greater numbers by the 
stringent Nazi policies and attitudes toward women in the 
work place. Women not only lost their sense of worth, by 
being told they were inferior and that they could not make 
worthwhile contributions, they also lost their ability to 
provide for their families adequately as wages dropped. 
Instead, they were told by the Reich that they could remain 
at home and produce children for Germany. 
The recognized that all segments of German 
culture were affected by Nazi persecutions and their 
reorganization of the state. Many groups, as a result, were 
traumatized and destroyed by contact with Hitler's regime. 
The Nazis wanted to restructure German and European 
societies in the National Socialist image. This Nazi picture 
included the annihilation of the Jews, communists, and 
social democrats. Nazi reaction extended to anyone who 
opposed them or represented the Weimar culture. Persecution 
did not always take legal form, and whether it was or not 
did not matter to the Nazis. The Nation knew the end result, 
complete Nazi dominance was the primary goal. The Nazis 
considered their acts of terror, physical violence, and 
46 Ibid ., p. 296. 
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murder to be expedient methods which enabled them to reach 
their goals. 
CHAPTER IV  
ATTITUDES TOWARD NAZI ECONOMIC POLICY  
AND ITS EFFECTS  
A central issue of Nazi policy, crucial to The 
Nation, was Germany's economic position and intended 
recovery. It saw the consequences of Nazi economic policies 
as a barometer of the Third Reich's success. The weekly, 
from the beginning of the Nazi regime in 1933, believed 
Hitler would be unsuccessful in his attempts to turn the 
German economy around. Even though Hitler attained success 
by 1936 with full employment due to the armament boom, The 
N in's primary concern was whether this general prosperity 
really benefited the workers of Germany. The journal was 
also concerned with what Hitler's rearmament resolutions 
would lead the Nazis to attempt because of inadequate raw 
materials available in Germany. 
In the early period under Nazi rule, the Germans, 
according to The ion, were not successful in their 
~~---
recovery attempts. In 1933, Hitler wanted a moratorium on 
the interests of the debts settled on Germany by the terms 
of the Versailles Treaty. The general shrinking of both 
exports and imports for Germany indicated a worsening of its 
economic position, according to The N n. The Reich's 
56 
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recovery program was based on increased output and a 
reduction of wages to meet its obligations. The periodical 
editorialized that this was an unsound principle because it 
destroyed the buying power of the German people which would 
lead to a collapse of the internal market. 1 The Na in's 
prediction was accurate as the German domestic market did 
collapse. Every government effort made since the internal 
collapse led the nation's industries and financial 
institutions even deeper into the morass. "Under Hitler 
2matters have gone from bad to worse." Hitler put into 
effect high tariffs on food stuffs and in so doing set off 
another inflationary spiral with staple prices rising 
anywhere from 10-50 per cent. In a jab at the Nazis, the 
editorial concluded with, H[iJt proves the futility of the 
Chancellor's visionary projects for social and economic 
reconstruction on a gigantic scale. It also shows why Herr 
Hitler so assiduously emphasizes his peaceful intentions.,,3 
Hitler had certainly not been able to manipulate the 
economic situation in Germany during the early years of Nazi 
control. 
The Nation expressed considerable concern for the 
worker in Nazi Germany. Hitler was not able to achieve the 
lEditorial, The Nation 136 (June 7, 1933):658.  
2 Ibid .  
3 Ibid .  
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economic changes needed to benefit the worker. There was 
also, some doubt at the weekly whether Hitler would want to 
benefit the worker if he was able to do so. As a 
consequence, The Nation asserted, the worker would gain the 
least and suffer the most (with the exception of the Jews) 
under Hitler's rule. The journal reported that the standard 
of living was steadily falling although employment had 
risen. There were 2,800,000 unemployed as compared with 
double that number when Hitler took office. The Nation, 
however, claimed that the figures for unemployment were 
juggled. But no evidence was offered to substantiate this 
claim. Improvement in unemployment could not be attributed 
solely to Nazi policy, according to the periodical. 
Reduction of unemployment was based largely on a worldwide 
increase in trade and economic conditions. 
Even though the standard of living had fallen and 
many workers were no better off or in worse economic 
positions than they were in 1933, lamented the 
working class, in general, still supported Hitler. In part, 
this was due to the fall in unemployment; however, the 
weekly believed there was another reason for continued 
support of Hi tIer. "Like everybody else, they [the workers] 
are still being drugged by the almost overwhelming 
government propaganda, by Hitler's eloquence. • they have 
not yet taken in the significance of Hitler's admission on 
April 17 that National Socialism can not abolish 
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unemployment." By August 1935, living costs had risen 6 per 
cent in four months, while average wages of unskilled 
workers dropped 18 per cent. Skilled labor, in comparison, 
lost 8.5 per cent in wages during the same period. 5 
The Nation was convinced, by 1935, the National 
Socialists were in trouble in Germany. Nazi policies were 
not successful in staving off the economic failures that the 
journal was sure had to come. There was little support of 
Hitler's economic policies as many German people lamented 
there had been little improvement in two years. There was 
growing unrest among small business men whom both the public 
and the government had accused of profiteering. Housewives 
resorted to consumer strikes and there were reports of wage 
movements in the industrial sections of Germany. "There are 
unmistakable signs of disintegration in the National 
Socialist regime. [T]here is hardly a group or class 
in the nation that is satisfied with the present state of 
affairs.,,6 
The Nazis, however, cheated The Nation out of its 
prediction. By 1938, full employment in Germany was achieved 
because of the armament boom which had begun in 1935 and 
resulted in a turn around of German attitudes toward Hitler 
4Editorial, The Nation 139 (Nay 23, 1934):579. 
5Editorial, The Nation 141 (August 7, 1935):145. 
6 Ibid . , P . 146. 
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and the Nazis. Even with this apparent victory, the weekly 
believed the Nazis did not achieve true prosperity for the 
German workers. Wages in 1938 stood at 1933 levels, reported 
The Nation. The average wage for skilled labor in 1929 was 
101.1 pfennigs per hour compared to 79 pfennigs in December 
of 1938. Already lowered wages were reduced further by heavy 
taxation, voluntary contributions, social-insurance 
contributions, and so forth. The size of these deductions 
can be inferred from the fact that taxes and donations 
totaled 47.1 per cent of the entire national income. 7 The 
cost of living had also increased. If cost of living was 
estimated conservatively at a 10-15 per cent increase since 
1933, real wages, were, thus, considerably smaller than in 
1933. The five million unemployed of 1933 were better off in 
1938-39, whereas "the thirteen million who had jobs when 
Hitler came to power have suffered a substantial loss in 
real income and had no share in the apparent prosperity.,,8 
Therefore, The Nation believed that even though Germany 
enjoyed full employment, prosperity did not benefit everyone 
in the Third Reich. As a group, most workers were less well 
off than they were before Hitler's regime began in 1933. 
The German worker had lost real income and was not 
truly benefited by full employment. The Nation felt the 
7Adolf Strumthal, "The End of Hitler's Money 
Hiracles," The Nation 148 (April 22, 1939):461. 
8 Ibid . 
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workers lost, additionally, because of the disabilities they 
suffered under the Third Reich's full employment policies. 
The weekly was convinced that overwork and undernourishment 
resulted in many millions of lost hours of labor due to 
illness and disability. Thirty-one workers per hundred, in 
1932, were on illness disability compared to 46 per hundred 
in 1938. 9 In January 1939, disability rates were 31.5 per 
cent greater than in December 1938. Most workers faced a 
work day in excess of eight hours, often working ten hours a 
day, and in some cases, fourteen hours a day in a work week 
of six days. The Nazis reacted with severe penalties for the 
many workers who slowed down or stayed away from work. Dr. 
Robert Ley, the head of the Labor Front, "put it bluntly, 
'Socialism in the Third Reich is a hard manly socialism; not 
the well-being of the individual but that of the community 
matters' .,,10 The Nation was not in agreement with this 
assessment. The workers were needed for the state's 
armaments efforts. "His [Hitler's] labor policy is designed 
to get more work out of men who have less to eat. But even a 
dictator cannot override physical laws.,,11 What were the 
benefits for the worker under the Reich's full employment? 
The weekly concluded, "[tJhus 'full employment' in Hitler's 
9Judith Gruenfeld, ",.,Thy Hitler Must Bluff," The 
149 (July 8, 1939):36. 
10Ibid ., p. 37. 
11 Ibid ., p. 36. 
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Reich is not identical with workers' well-being but actually 
entails their own complete exhaustion.,,12 Health and 
disability issues coupled with the lack of improvement in 
real wages for the workers in Germany, led Nation to 
down play any success claimed by the Nazis. The journal 
believed true success must also include improvement for all 
the workers and their working conditions. 
Because full employment and Germany's economic 
independence were essential for the armament program, the 
country was put on the Four Year Plan in 1936. This placed 
Germany on a war time economy and the entire German economy 
was mobilized in the process. Again, German workers 
suffered, this time, because of shortages. The Nation held 
"the unappeased appetite of the war industries has created a 
crisis in non-armament plants.,,13 Raw materials went first 
to war industries with the result that all goods were in 
short supply; there was little left over for civilian 
consumption. Secondly, one of the Four- ar Plan's principal 
reasons for existence was to alter the food habits of the 
nation. Inadequate supplies of staple products (fats, meats, 
dairy products, fruits, vegetables, and grains) in 
combination with other shortages, have "made the German the 
l2 Ibid ., pp. 36-37. 
13L • F. Gittler, "No Food for \-Jar," The Nation 149 
(July 8, 1939):39. 
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worst-fed and worst-clothed person in Europe.,,14 Doctors 
reported more cases of nutritional diseases during 1938 than 
in all ten years prior to Hitler's regime. 
The Nation wanted to know how the Nazis combated the 
grumbling and discontent of the afflicted Germans. The 
weekly found the Nazis used propaganda, one of their 
favorite approaches for any problem. First, Nazi propaganda 
showed that Germans were not so badly off. Pictures of 
Americans, taken in the depths of the depression, showed 
there were worse conditions than in Germany. Second, 
Germany's poverty could be blamed on unfair treaties and 
reparations. Third, world Jewry cornered the international 
market in food stuffs and refused to sell them to the Reich. 
Fourth, luxury foods, such as white bread, were termed by 
Nazis as decadent indulgences that could be replaced with 
more wholesome foods. The Nation maintained that propaganda 
could not alter the facts; shortages existed and as a 
consequence workers were not prospering in the Third Reich. 
The second purpose of the Plan was to foster German 
economic independence. The Four-Year Plan "is to insure the 
Reich against economic coercion, particularly in time of 
war."lS Considerable efforts were made to make Germany 
independent. For example, research was done on artificial 
14 Ibid ., p. 38. 
1SJohn C. DevHlde, "Dr. Schacht and Germany's 
Future," The Nation 145 (October 16, 1937):402. 
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products to produce the goods and foodstuffs that Geroany 
needed. However, one of the negative aspects of the Four-
Year Plan, at least for business men and Dr. Schacht, 
Minister of Economics and President of the Reichsbank, was 
the acceleration of the trend toward government control over 
German business. By 1938 the Nazis controlled all foreign 
trade, rationed and stipulated uses of raw materials, fixed 
wages and prices, destroyed trade unions and as a result 
were in control of labor, invested capital where they saw 
fit, and used profits where prescribed by Nazi needs. 16 
Certainly The Nation believed that economic progress in Nazi 
Germany primarily benefited the state, as represented by 
Hitler, and what was good for the state did not correspond 
to what was good for the citizens. 
On the other hand, there was every indication that 
Germany had made great economic strides. Just gearing up for 
the armament process was an industrial success in the face 
of overwhelming odds, but Th Nation asked who benefited 
from these apparent accomplishments and how had the Reich 
been able to finance its rearmament? The Nazis accomplished 
their goals primarily through two finance measures. The 
first of these was direct borrowing. In January of 1938, the 
officially admitted debt stood at 18,600 million Reichmarks, 
which was twice the debt of 1933. Second, Germany used 
16 Ibid ., p. 403. 
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taxation of its citizens as another avenue for obtaining 
finances. Germans in 1938 were some of the most highly taxed 
persons in Europe. Taxes in 1938 were double the amount of 
1933, and the rise of income had not kept pace with this 
17level in taxation. Nevertheless, even with the sharp rise 
in production and stable consumption figures, thanks to the 
Four-Year Plan, it was clear "that all gain has been devoted 
to armaments and state needs and has afforded little benefit 
to the individual." l8 
The Nation understood that the Nazi monetary 
requirements for their rearmament plans involved their need 
to buy raw materials or somehow gain control of the regions 
that produced their vital materials. Nazi Germany required 
more raw resources than it had available to supply its 
armament program. The coming war would be even more 
19dependent upon machines than the last one. The next war, 
feared by most Europeans and Americans, would be won by 
those countries which could continue to produce war 
20machinery while the war raged on. Certain fundamentals for 
l7 A. Vidakovic, "How Sound Is German Economy?," The 
Nation 146 (April 16, 1938) :437. 
l8 Ibid ., p. 438. 
19Fritz Sternberg, "Time Is \.,[ith the Allies," The 
Nation 149 (October 14, 1939):407. 
20Maxwell S. Stewart, "Can Europe Afford War?," The 
143 (September 19, 1936):324-26; Fritz Sternberg, 
.;.;.::-=-::....:::....:.:.-s \.Jith the Allies," p. 407. 
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an effective war industry were an established iron and steel 
industry, as well as established machine and chemical 
production. And, of course, assured supplies of coal, iron 
ore, and oil were essential to their armament production. 
Germany was not supplied with most of these vital raw 
materials. Coal being the only resource Germany adequately 
produced, the Reich had to trade for oil, iron are, and 
chemicals. The Treaty of Versailles had taken away most of 
the regions that had supplied Germany's iron ore (75 per 
cent) and chemical needs. Germany had never had any oil of 
1ts For five-sixths. own. 21 examp 1e, of the Germans iron ore 
requirements came from other countries. In 1937, Germany 
produced 9.6 million tons of iron ore and imported 20.6 
million tons. In addition, German ore was not as rich in 
iron as the imported sources. The Reich's war potential was, 
22therefore, extremely dependent upon foreign sources. These 
raw materials, vital to Germany, were available to the east 
and the west. Rumania was rich in oil, Yugoslavia had many 
fine chemical deposits, and both Czechoslovakia and the 
· F . 2 3 Lorra1ne area a f rance were r1C h"1n 1ron ore. Th Nation 
believed that the Reich's need for raw materials was one of 
21 r1ax \<lell S. Stewart, "Can Europe Afford \..Jar?," p. 
325. 
22Joachim Joesten, "Germany vs. Russia in the 
North," 	The Nation 148 (June 24, 1939):719. 
23Maxwell S. Stewart, "Can Europe Afford \var?," p. 
325. 
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the reasons that it retook the Rhineland in 1936. The rich 
deposits and available resources in the countries and 
regions surrounding Germany were essential to the Reich's 
future war efforts. Nation believed this to be true as 
early as 1936, its evidence was the retaking of the 
Rhineland. Industrial materials were so vital that "they 
might easily swing the balance in the next war. . If by 
reason of deficiency or foreign exchanges or sanctions these 
supplies were withheld, it is highly probable that they 
would be seized.,,24 A highly astute assessment, by the 
weekly, of future events and German motivation. The Na ion 
reasoned that Germany saw the development of their war 
industry as crucial for the Reich's survival in a future 
war. Weaponry was not only crucial for survival, but was 
needed by Hitler to fulfill his other planned foreign policy 
aspirations. 
Although the Nazis got off to a rocky start in 1933, 
they were able to turn the German economy around by starting 
the rearmament process in 1934. T Nation, however, 
supported the supposition that full employment did not 
necessarily, benefit everyone in Germany. In particular, the 
journal was concerned for the workers and for good reason as 
its evidence shows. The i n, also, linked the Nazi ~~~= 
24 Ibid ., p. 326. 
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rearmament industry and the necessity for raw resources with 
the Nazi aspirations for territorial expansion. 
CHAPTER V  
HITLER'S FOREIGN POLICY ASPIRATIONS AND  
EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN RESPONSE  
The Nation reacted to Hitler's foreign policy in two 
ways. First, the weekly analyzed what Hitler's goals were 
and how he intended to accomplish them. Hitler wanted to 
pursue an aggressive foreign policy. To justify his actions 
and methods with Germans and the rest of Europe, Hitler 
relied upon German history, Germany's economic needs, and 
the creation of pan-Germanism. The techniques the Nazis 
utilized were not subtle at all. They used agents who 
infiltrated other countries with the intention of 
overthrowing the governments of the coveted nations. In 
addition to this propaganda program, Hitler appealed to the 
duty and loyalty of Germans living in other countries. 
Hitler began his plan for the creation of a pan ermanic 
empire by breaking Versailles and achieving with 
Austria. Next Czechoslovakia was seized and, finally, Poland 
was captured. 
Second, the weekly was concerned with the reactions 
Hitler's policies would bring. It knew war was probably 
inevitable if Hitler was allowed to continue with his plans 
unchecked. The believed Americans had to adopt 
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policies that would keep them out of any European conflict. 
Collective security was the method of keeping the U.S. out 
of war that was advocated by the journal. The best 
expression of collective security was through economic 
sanctions. This policy also had the advantage, according to 
the collective security advocates, in that it night stop the 
German fascists which was the goal of its primary advocate, 
Freda Kirchwey. She was editor-in-chief and had a crusading 
devotion to the destruction of fascism. The other editors at 
The Nation also supported collective security. The one hold 
out was Oswald Garrison Villard, and he supported the 
American neutrality policy. However, Kirchwey could not 
accept neutrality as she believed it would not halt fascism, 
and just as importantly, it would not keep the United States 
out of a war. Hitler would be free to continue with his 
disruptive, aggressive aspirations if neutrality was 
adopted. 
The Nation felt Hitler had to pursue a forceful 
policy to insure his dictatorship within the Third Reich. 
"Hitler can only consolidate his dictatorship by pursuing an 
aggressive foreign policy which, according to the Minister 
for Propaganda, leads toward a Teutonic empire embracing all 
the German-speaking peoples of Europe." 1 Dictators waging 
1Johannes Steel, "Europe Moves Toward War: V. The 
Mechanics of Nationa1ism," T Nation 138 (April 11, 
1934):411. 
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.- wars was nothing new explained The Nation. Despots 
throughout history have had to consolidate themselves by 
embarking upon spectacular foreign conquests. Hitler joined 
the ranks of others such as: Alexander the Great, Julius 
Ceasar, Cromwell, and Napoleon. 2 The Nation added that 
Hitler had to pursue a belligerent foreign policy because of 
the economic situation in Germany. Economic conditions had 
grown progressively worse over the previous twelve months 
and by 1934, conditions were extremely grim. The German 
citizens were growing restive and disgruntled with Hitler's 
regime. The journal believed it would become imperative for 
Hitler to divert the Germans if he wanted to retain his 
power. "The only way to distract attention from political 
and economic developments within Germany is to embark on 
foreign political adventures bringing 'conquest and 
glory' • ,,3 
The Nation feared that Hitler's foreign policy was 
aimed at more than securing his position at home. He wanted 
to control Europe as well, and this particular aspiration 
was based, in part, on his sense of German history. The 
National Socialists final goal for their foreign strategy 
was the "restoration of the Holy Roman Empire of the 
Germanic race and its far-flung border lines, along which 
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Barbarossa's stalwart crusaders converged a thousand years 
ago.,,4 These were the ultimate Nazi ambitions. 
The Nation saw that part of Hitler's avowed foreign 
policy was his promise to remove Germany from the 
constraints of the Treaty of Versailles, which Germans felt 
was an intolerable outrage against every German. This meant 
that, in addition to other areas of the Treaty, the sections 
that took away German lands and colonies must be revised. As 
soon as he was able, Hitler acted on his pledge. In 1933, 
Hitler left the League of Nations. In 1935, he freed Germany 
from the disarmament clauses in the Treaty of Versailles. In 
1936, Hitler violated the Locarno Pact by moving German 
troops into the Rhineland. As The Nation interpreted it, 
Hitler's victory over the Rhineland issue dealt a severe 
blow to the peace keeping system in Europe. The Locarno ct 
was held to be a primary peace keeper in Europe and it was 
nullified by German actions. Also, the League of Nations was 
substantially weakened when the member nations failed to act 
on Germany's transgressions. Even so, The continued 
to support the principle of the League's sanctions. The 
journal believed that the tactics and actions urged in 
Hitler's Mein constituted the backbone of Nazi policy 
I~Ernest Schulz, "Germany Prepares for War, 11 h 
137 (September 27, 1933):353. 
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up to and including 1936. 5 The occupation of the Rhineland 
was also part of Hitler's objective for the completion of a 
European pan-Germanic empire. "Germany's immediate ambitions 
lie toward the East, and to assure a free hand in such a 
campaign Hitler desires above all else a guaranty of 
stability in the West.,,6 With Germany once more in 
possession of the Rhineland, German soldiers were on the 
French border. France would not be able to come to the aid 
of her allies to the East without, first, contending with 
the German army. This explained why Hitler occupied the 
Rhineland before turning to the East. Actually Hitler 
desired more than stability in the West as The Nation 
observed later. 
The Nation reported that the Nazis believed they had 
economic justification for their foreign policy aspirations. 
Nazi dreams of expansion were based on "economic theories 
which have been evolved solely to suit these ambitions.,,7 
Every nation, according to the Nazis, had to extend its 
orbit of economic and political influence in order to 
survive in the modern world. Germany's natural area of 
economic and political influence extended from the Baltic 
5Editorial, "Has Hitler Hon Out?," The Nation 142 
(April 1, 1936):401. 
6 Ibid . 
7Johannes Steel, "Europe Moves Toward War: II. 
Germany's Dream of Expansion," The Nation 138 (March 21, 
1934):324. 
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states to deep into the agricultural countries of the Balkan 
region. The Nazis held that the creation of a Third Empire 
would make Germany economically self-sufficient and 
independent of other countries infl ence. "These theories 
complement Hitler's racial, mystical, and 
S
appeal." Furthermore, The Nation believed if one understood 
the Nazi aspirations, the drive to coordinate Austria with 
Germany was not an end in itself; it was instead "an initial 
step in the realization of the Nazi dreams of a self 
contained Third Reich stretching from the Baltic to the 
Adriatic.,,9 
What was The Nation's attitude toward the Nazi 
expansionist plans? The weekly deplored the policy and 
actions of the Nazis in Europe. To begin with, The Nation 
was not in agreement with the Nazi's economic justification. 
It perceived, instead, that the National Socialists were 
covering up their own personal ambitions. The Nation's 
reaction can be summarized by Walter Duranty in a 1937 
issue. Hitler and his minions were recognized as the "dark 
forces" in Europe. The struggle on the European continent 
was believed to be one between two ideologies. Mr. Duranty, 
in his analysis, cleverly took a statement of Hitler's that 
there is a struggle between Civilization and the dark 
crthe strugin Europe. It isideologies going on 
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forces. Hitler meant that the National Socialists 
represented Civilization. Duranty asked which is 
Civilization and which are the dark forces. He accepted 
Hitler's premise but reversed it. "There is a struggle of 
ideologies going on in Europe. It is the struggle of cruelty 
and reaction against all that noble men from Socrates to 
Jefferson have fought for throughout history."lO All of 
Europe was to be involved in the conflict which would result 
when Nazi Germany moved to fulfill its aspirations. German 
strategy was formulated by the Nazis to insure that their 
goals for the Reich were realized. As early as 1934, the 
Reich was seen to be at work endeavoring to carry out Nazi 
policy. This was attempted in several different ways. 
The Nation reported countries were infiltrated by 
Nazis agents and cells were formed. In most of the Baltic 
states, these groups worked toward a "coordination" of all 
other nations with the Nazi policies and goals. Nazi 
propagandists worked day and night in Lithuania, Latvia, and 
Estonia. These regions, however, were not to be the only 
areas in Europe manipulated by the Nazi agents. In fact "at 
this moment a closely knit network of spies and agents 
provocateurs covers the whole of rope."ll As an example, 
1atv a 1 t e r D u ran t y, " Hit 1 e r 's H0 use 0 f Car d s ," The 
Nation 144 (January 2, 1937): 10. 
llJohannes Steel, "Europe Moves Toward ~"ar: II. 
Germany's Dream of Expansion," p. 325. 
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after an investigation, the Dutch found that Nazi agents had 
set up propaganda cells and organizational centers in 
garages in Holland. Continuous propaganda expounding 
Hitler's principles of racial and political discrimination 
was maintained in most European countries in an endeavor to 
weaken other countries governments. One of the key factors 
in the Nazi propaganda work was their cells and associated 
agents. 
Another propaganda technique, used by the Nazis, was 
delineated by The Nation. It was a petition made directly to 
the Germans living in other countries. This appeal was for 
the realization of a pan-Germanic movement, which was to 
unite all Germans in the cause for the National Socialists 
back home in the Fatherland. As early as 1930, the famous 
program of twenty-five points of National Socialism 
contained this sentence. "'We cannot give up a single German 
in Sudeten Germany, in South Tyrol [changed in 1931 to 
Alsace-Lorraine], in Poland, in the League of Nations colony 
Austria, or in the succession states' ,,,12 This quotation 
reveals that even prior to their succession to power in 
1933, Hitler and his cohorts intended to appeal to and 
manipulate Germans living in other European countries to 
further Nazi ambitions and policies. Germans had settled in 
areas allover Europe. They lived in areas from the Metz to 
12Ludwig Lore, "Tyrol Germans Don't Count," The 
Nation 146 (May 21, 1938):585. 
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the Volga, from the Gulf of Finland to Serbia. "National 
Socialism spares no effort to inspire in these Teutonic 
minorities a spirit of rebellion against their respective 
govern r]" , .,,13 "If these groups with their Nazi leadership 
were not able to gain control of other governments directly, 
they were in place for future use by Hitler. He intended, 
through his manipulations and proposed takeovers of other 
governments, to complete his foreign policy aspirations. 
As early as 1934, The Nation understood that the key 
to European peace was in the hands of the French who 
seemingly missed their opportunity to halt the Germans. 
After the election of Hitler and the Nazis, if France and 
her European allies had marched into Germany little 
resistance would have been offered. 14 Since 1933, the 
Germans had broken the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of 
Versailles by rearming. By 1934, rearmament in Germany had 
advanced considerably. France's first step would have been 
to demand the League of Nations make an inquiry into German 
armaments under Article 213 of the Treaty of Versailles. 
Daladier and France took no such action; again the French 
missed their opportunity. Even with much ground being lost 
by 1934, The Nation believed France still had the 
13Henrr C. Wolfe, "fascism Charts Its Course," The 
144 (January 2, 1937):17. 
14Robert Dell, "\.Jill Germany Conquer France?," The 
138 (April 18, 1934):441. 
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opportunity to defend civilization from the "barbarians." 
"[O]ne hopes and believes, in the power of France to 
organize the forces necessary for that defense and to 
repulse the new barbarian invasion. If France fails, 
. '1' . 1 filS hEuropean C~Vl lzatlon lS. ost. E'ls ast c ance f orurope 
peace was to be determined by the French reaction to German 
policies. 
The Nation considered France to be a relatively 
strong country after the war, and that it was not bothered 
by Hitler in the early years of his dictatorship. But what 
of the other countries that were not as strong and 
resourceful as France? Certainly Hitler wanted to dominate 
other nations, and these aspirations were part of his 
foreign policy. It also appeared that Germany would probably 
not have to fight to gain most of that dominance. Hitler 
realized that many Europeans did not want to fight after the 
devastation of World War I. The costs of the last war were 
still fresh in the minds and hearts of most people. 
According to The Nation, Hitler's attempted conquest 
of Austria was lIa subtle and dangerous experiment in 
bloodless belligerence.,,16 Assimilation of Austria was one 
of the top foreign policy aims of the early Nazi regime. 
Pan-Germanism was the same as Hitlerism. The Nazis wanted to 
ISIbid. 
16John Gunther, "Danger Still in Austria," The 
Nation 137 (September 20, 1933):320. 
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assert the pure and dominant unity of the German nation by 
absorbing Austria. In 1933, 6.5 million Austrians were of 
German decent, a full quarter of the Austrian population. 17 
Furthermore, Hitler wanted to achieve an Anschluss with 
Austria. He gambled that direct warfare need not be the 
method used to achieve his goals. Germany was neither fully 
prepared for war nor was it necessary if a less violent 
method could gain the result Hitler wanted. Political and 
economic forces were brought to bear upon Austria by 
Germany. 
Dollfuss, the Austrian Chancellor, refused to 
acquiesce to Nazi demands and propaganda; the more the Nazis 
attacked Dollfuss, assessed The Nation, the better pretext 
he had to rule semi-dictatorially. This in a sense was a 
defeat for the Nazis because they needed an electoral 
success for victory. Dollfuss, by adducing the gravity of 
the crisis, staved off general elections almost 
indefinitely. The Austrians believed they were but the first 
step in the fulfillment of a pan-Germanic Nazi policy. 
Dollfuss himself believed this: "if the Nazis take Austria 
they will inevitably turn toward Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia 
next, even to Switzerland and Denmark.,,18 
17 Ibid .  
18 Ibid ., p. 322.  
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However, The Nation knew the fight for Austrian 
independence would not be easy. It believed Dollfuss faced 
great dangers -there were four obstacles to maintaining 
Austrian indepenrI nce. These impediments were: the geIJ"al 
apathy of the Austrian people, the strategic difficulty of 
fighting a civil and external action at the same time, the 
overwhelming burden of the economic crisis, and treason in 
the form of wholesale defection of the Heimwehr to the Nazi 
camp. In addition to these difficulties, the Austrians were 
a kindly people whose government behaved with appalling 
lenience. Most Austrians did not seem to be aware of the 
nature of their enemy, the Nazis. For example, an official 
Austrian communique regretted the necessity of jailing 
rebellious Nazis; "it mentioned Austria's hope that the Nazi 
invasion could be handled in a 'knightly spirit'." The 
Nation could not believe Austrian naivety and responded 
with, "[k]nightly spirit my eyeball! The only treatment a 
Nazi understands is a mallet on his head.,,19 The weekly 
observed the Austrian national character to be much too 
naive when it carne to understanding what the Nazis were 
about. 
The Nation viewed Dollfuss as a reactionary 
parochialist who also had dictatorial aspirations. He was 
still better than the Nazis, according to one view at the 
19John Gunther, "Keeping Hitler Out of Austria," 
Nation 138 (February 14, 1934):180. 
81  
weekly. Dollfuss had one saving grace: his courage and 
tenacity were keeping the Nazis out of power in Austria. In 
fact, The Nation believed "[f]or the Nazis to take Austria 
would be a major European tragedy. Therefor, re etting 
much in his policy, I support Dollfuss so long as he does 
his job, the supreme job of saving Austria from Hitler.,,20 
Although one view at The tion perceived Dollfuss 
as better than Hitler, another view held Dollfuss was almost 
as bad as Hitler. The worse thing for Austrian independence 
was Dollfuss' dictatorship; in fact, "the dictatorship [was] 
Austria's weakness.,,21 In order to maintain his power, 
Dollfuss had to weaken and destroy the social democrats and 
rely upon the Heimwehr to a great extent. Dollfuss was doing 
the Nazis' job for them, destroying groups that had opposed 
fascism. Instead, he relied upon the Heimwehr, which would 
support an authoritarian state, whether it was his or the 
Nazis did not matter. What would enable the Austrians to 
defeat the Nazi campaign? It certainly was not going to be 
Dollfuss. The journal believed there was an alternative 
direction for Austria. "The only way in which Austria could 
offer resistance to . . German fascism and thus give real 
content to the present empty slogan of Austrian independence 
20 Ibid ., p. 181. 
21Louis Fischer, "Arms Over Europe: Austria Dams the 
Nazi Flood," The Nation 142 (February 26,1936):247. 
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would be to set up a democratic government.,,22 A democracy 
would have a chance of keeping the Nazis out of Austria. A 
dictatorship would surely encourage it. 
By late 1934, Th Nation recognized that Austria and 
Dollfuss would not be able to hold out forever against the 
Nazis. What would be the consequences of a Nazi take over 
for the Austrians? The weekly believed that National 
Socialism would certainly not benefit the Austrians and 
other nationalities living in Austria. In fact, the 
consequences of Nazi rule would be dire indeed. Aside from 
being the completion of the first step in the Nazi pan 
Germanic dream of a Third Reich which would extend from the 
Baltic to the Adriatic, Hitler had other plans, as well, for 
the Austrians. 
However, Th Nation asked what of the 400,000 Jews 
who lived in Austria? If the Nazis applied their maternal 
grandmother test, they would have "at least a million 
victims which they can sacrifice to their insane racial 
theories.,,23 German National Socialist rule in Austria would 
also mean displacement or the concentration camp for tens of 
thousands of non-Jewish writers, artists, teachers, 
scientists, and any other persons who were connected to the 
22 Ibid • 
23Johannes Steel, !fEuro e Moves Toward War: I. The 
Bloody Danube and Beyond," The i n 138 (March 7, 
1934):270 
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Socialists or Marxists. 24 In addition, most of Austria's 
political, cultural, and social life would be replaced by 
Nazi ideology. 
The Nation wanted to discover what the overthrow of 
the Austrian government would mean for the rest of Europe. 
The immediate threat from the Nazis would be to the Little 
Entente. Nazi propaganda would naturally take advantage of 
the moral effect the German victory in Austria would create 
in the German minorities in the Little Entente. In fact, 
Nazi propaganda, which was already penetrating the Balkans, 
"would then issue an appeal to the many German minorities 
scattered allover Southeastern and Central Europe.,,25 
Victory for the Nazis in Austria would give them the means 
to continue their effective work and propaganda in other 
European countries. 
When Anschluss finally came to Austria on February 
15, 1938, The Nation was not surprised. After all, 
coordination with Austria was the policy Germany had worked 
for since 1934. Once Germany had absorbed the Austrian 
state, its population rose to 73 million while France's 
population was at 42 million. Germany was well on its way to 
becoming the dominant power of Continental Europe. 26 The 
24 Ibid . 
25 Ibid • 
26Ludwig Lore, "Austria--Last Chapter," The Nation 
146 (February 26, 1938):235. 
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democracies of Europe had failed to stand up to the Nazi 
dictatorship. In fact, by allowing Germans to bring troops 
to her border with the reoccupation of the formerly 
demilitarized area in 1936, France made it impossible for 
its armies to come to the aid of its allies in Eastern 
Europe. In an editorial, The Nation summed up the Austrian 
Anschluss as it perceived the outcome. Austria was the first 
step into the abyss with the results uncertain for the rest 
of Europe. "For in failing to take a stand against fascist 
aggression while they have overwhelming military 
preponderance, the democracies are not only making a world 
war inevitable, but are endangering their chances of victory 
when it comes.,,27 
Czechoslovakia, predicted The Nation, would be next. 
At the very least Czechoslovakia would face dismemberment 
and division by Germany, Poland, and Hungary.28 Certainly as 
some believed, with German soldiers now on the Czechoslovak-
Austrian border, Czechoslovakia faced the immediate danger 
of being the next nation to be swallowed by Germany.29 The 
partition of Czechoslovakia meant there was an imminent 
threat for the rest of the region from the Nazis. 
27Editorial, The Nation 146 (February 26, 1938):233. 
28 Ludwig Lore, "Austria -Last Chapter," p.235. 
29Robert Dell, "Europe Learns from Vienna," Th 
Nation 146 (March 19, 1938):320. 
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e Nation understood as early as 1937 that 
Czechoslovakia was the key to central Europe. If the Nazis 
could destroy the Czech democracy, then the road down the 
Danube would be open for further Nazi aggression. 30 Because 
of their pan-Germanic aspirations, the German fascists 
needed a territory that would provide a reservoir of raw 
materials and an outlet for their surplus population. 
Czechoslovakia would certainly fulfill both needs for the 
Nazis. Czechoslovakia "is slated to be the first nation to 
fall beneath Hitler's chariot wheels in his nach 
Osten.,,31 
The Nation was not fooled by Hitler's demands of 
self-determination for the Germans in the Sudetenland. The 
weekly was certain he aspired to much more. This was, in 
essence, a call for the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. 32 
Hitler's demands, essentially, confirmed that Germany was 
"not interested so much in 'rescuing' the Sudeten Germans as 
in bringing the whole of Czechoslovakia within the German 
b Ot 1133 H" I "h" f Ior l . It er was uSlng lS strategy ormu ated earlier: 
reliance upon the existence of Germans in other countries to 
30Hen rye. \.J 0 I fe, " N a z i Eye sTu r n E a s t ," T Nation 
145 (November 6, 1937):502. 
31 Ibid ., p. 504. 
32 . F" h,HIlS lSC er, "\.Jhy Germany Feared ~"ar, II 
Nation 147 (November 12, 1938):505. 
33Editorial, "If Hitler Has His l..Jay," 147 
(October 1, 1938):312. 
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further his racial, pan-Germanic aspirations. The rest of 
Europe was, indeed, threatened. In fact, capitulation of 
Czechoslovakia would undercut Hungary's defenses against 
complete Nazi domination. But the Nazis had not intended to 
stop with Czechoslovakia and Hungary. 
A prostrate Czechoslovakia is clearly but a means to an 
end. It would remove the last barrier to Hitler's 
control of Central Europe, and would lay the basis for 
early demands for Memel, Danzig, Schlesing, South Tyr~!, 
and other territories partially populated by Germans. 
felt Czechoslovakia was betrayed by the 
English and French agreement with Hitler at Munich. 
Additionally, the partition of Czechoslovakia, by and with 
the consent of France and Great Britain, had given Hitler 
another form of victory, according to the weekly. Hitler's 
demands were based on the relationship of racial status to 
political status. In other words, a person's racial 
derivation established his political adherence. Sudeten 
Germans, though Czechoslovakian citizens, had the right to 
self-determination under German rule because of their German 
The 
racial heritage. The Nation quoted GSring speaking to 
Germans abroad: 
The National Socialist government expects every German 
residing abroad to put the interest of his Fatherland 
before his own. You Germans abroad must remember, that 
wherever you are, you represent the interests of 
Germany. Always remember that the Fatherland comes first 
34 Ibid . 
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and the rest of the world after. The German living 35 
abroad can be nothing else but a National Socialist. 
Prior to the partition of Czechoslovakia, The Nation 
believed, Nazi racial theory was nothing but propaganda. It 
was the ~azi claim to Czechoslovakia, British, and French 
acquiescence to this racial claim which raised Nazi 
propaganda to the level of a principle of international 
action and Xazi right. 36 The acceptance of the Nazi racial 
proposition, by the two leading democracies in Europe, was 
perceived by The Nation as a direct threat to the United 
States. Hitler's racial propaganda, established as a 
principle in Europe, was anathema to Americans. Race was 
left behind by the immigrants from Europe when they came to 
the New World. People of many different racial stocks came 
to the American colonies not to found a new race, but a 
0peop 1e. 37 Amer~cans0 0 f German descent dOd~ not owe t he~r 
allegiance to their Fatherland as the Nazis suggested. Nor 
did the victory of Xazi racial theory bode well for the rest 
of Europe either. Europe appeared to be on the brink of war. 
In the meantime, Hitler's policy had come to fruition and 
"Germany, the only country in Europe capable of plunging 
Europe into a general war, has won a hand. The new cards are 
35Archibald ~1acLeish, "Hunich and the Americans,1f 
The ~ation 147 (October 15, 1938):370-71. 
36 Ibid ., p. 371. 
37 Ibid . 
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in the hands of the potential aggressor.,,38 Initiative Has 
now with Hitler. 
When Hitler demanded Danzig and the Corridor, The 
Nation kneH this was Hitler's next step in his scheme for 
the completion of his pan-Germanic policy. After the 
destruction of Czechoslovakia and the assessment of Munich, 
as a failure for gaining European security, the only 
question for the journal was Hhether there Hould be another 
Munich or not. Would Great Britain and France comply with 
Hitler's demands this time around? One crucial, key element 
that affected Hitler's tactics Hould be the reaction of the 
Poles. Poland stood firm; they refused German and Soviet 
demands. Hitler would have to fight to obtain Poland. 39 This 
time, with Poland, most Europeans finally realized that 
treaties and agreements could not be made Hith Hitler. He 
broke everyone made prior to his demands for Polish 
territory. What was to guarantee European security? It 
certainly was not going to be agreements made Hith Hitler. 
"A feeling of having their backs to the vfall has united the 
democracies and clarified the issue as one of totalitarian 
domination.,,40 One could almost hear a sigh of relief 
38John Gunther, "The Rhineland Crisis," The Nation 
142 (April 1, 1936) :408. 
39 Henry B. Kranz, "Poland and the German 'Peace' ,T! 
The Nation 147 (September 19, 1938):533. 
40Aylmer Vallance, "No Munich," The Nation 149 
(September 2, 1939):236. 
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expressed by The Nation with the report of the European 
democracies finally unifying against Hitler. The independent 
press, including The Nation, had asserted for years "that 
Hitler couldn't be bargained with.!,41 Most of the countries 
in Europe had come to realize Hitler's pan-Germanic policy 
was an organized system of persecution that would eventually 
crush their political and economic liberties. "[T]he 
governments of the Western nations must fight for their 
existence. ,,,42 Conditions could only grow worse under a 
National Socialist foreign policy that was growing 
increasingly belligerent and aggressive in the Nazis' 
attempt to fulfill the objectives of Hein Kampf. ~lost now 
believed Hitler was using Danzig and the Corridor as an 
excuse to gain a greater objective--Poland, which would go 
the way of Czechoslovakia. "It is universally recognized 
that the problem of Danzig is merely incidental, but 
concessions based on a reliance of Nazi good-will are vetoed 
as involving a crisis under conditions progressively 
deteriorating. 1t43 
The Nation discerned that Hitler did not expect the 
democracies to declare war against Germany over the Polish 
issue. "Hitler obviously believed to the end, in spite of 
41Freda Kirchwey, "Munich Bears Fruit," (Editorial) 
h Nation 149 (September 9, 1939):259. 
42 Ibid ., p. 260. 
43 Aylmer Vallance, "No Munich," p. 236. 
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rearmament and conscription and the slowly growing peace 
front, that he could have his way without war.,,44 Hitler's 
diplomatic coup in Moscow with the non-aggression pact and 
the British attempts to negotiate to the very end probably 
helped to deceive Hitler. The democracies had drawn the 
line; Germany could no longer step over it without war. When 
the demands came for Danzig and the Corridor, France and 
England were prepared. They ultimately must have expected 
Hitler's actions as their war preparations had been swift. 
They had finally learned not to trust Hitler's promises 
either. 
Nazi foreign policy was based on the destruction of 
the Treaty of Versailles, the Locarno Pact, and the 
weakening of the League of Nations. Hitler's actions grew 
progressively more aggressive in seeking his goals. He 
obtained the land, people, and resources Germany needed and 
wanted in their bid to carry out his racial, economic, and 
political policies expounded in Mein Kampf. In the process, 
all hope for a collective security was destroyed. During the 
period from 1934 to 1939, while Hitler's policy grew more 
aggressive, what had been The Nation's reactions to Nazi 
policy? What conduct for the United States did the weekly 
advocate in response to Hitler's destruction of peace in 
Europe? 
4 4 F red a K i r c h we y, "!,-1 u n i c h Be a r s F r u it," p. 260 . 
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During the five year period from 1934 to the 
beginning of the war in Europe in 1939, The Nation ran many 
editorials and articles on Nazi foreign policy. Its beliefs 
on how Germany should be dealt with by the United States and 
other European nations were clearly expressed. The Nation's 
key belief was that Hitler and Germany must be contained at 
the very least, and if at all possible, Nazi Germany must be 
cut off from the rest of Europe and strangled. If Germany, 
in 1934, was allowed to rearm then what? Rearmament would 
surely lead to another war unless the Nazis were stopped. 
"[W]ill they [the French] permit Hitler to continue to arm 
and to violate the Treaty of Versailles without acting? If 
so, they will find themselves in an armament race which can 
have only one ending.,,45 This ending, of course, would be 
war. The Nation was well aware that a preventive war was out 
of the question in 1934. There was too much pacifist 
sentiment in both Great Britain and France for there to be 
another war. What then was the answer for both the European 
powers and the United States? In answer to this question, 
many liberal views were expressed and examined in the 
journal. Neutrality, collective security expressed through 
sanctions, and new isolationism were the main avenues 
explored as answers in Th Nation. However, the editorials 
and the preponderance of articles clearly favored and 
45 Ed ltorla· . 1 , "Disarmament Retreats," T e Nation 138 
(May 2, 1934):495. 
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supported one position, collective security expressed 
through sanctions. One other person, Villard, the former 
editor and owner, supported neutrality. His position can 
hardly be expressed as equally dominant with collective 
security in The ~ation. Neutrality was very much a minority 
opinion. 
Both the supporters of collective security and 
Villard wanted to keep Americans out of any involvement with 
an eventual war in Europe. Villard and the editors 
disagreed, primarily, on how this goal was to be attained. 
They, also, diverged on whether the destruction of German 
fascism was a necessity that required their support. For 
Kirchwey, one of the goals of any policy she supported must 
be the eventual destruction of fascism. In an editorial in 
1935, The Nation came out in support of sanctions as a 
method for dealing with Hitler and the Nazis. German fascism 
had to be contained and stamped out; in this way, it was 
compared to an epidemic. "The truth is that once a major war 
has started, the chances of remaining out of it are slim. As 
in combating an epidemic, the best strategy is to prevent 
the virus from gaining a foothold.,,46 Sanctions would put 
commercial and financial pressures on the Nazis, and it 
would be futile to invoke economic measures against Germany 
without the full cooperation of the United States. The 
4 6 E d ito ria 1, " San c t ion s 0 r ~-v a r? ," T h Nat ion 1 4 1 
(September 4, 1935):256. 
93  
Nation believed sanctions were the alternative to war that 
both Europeans and Americans could support. Because the 
United States could assist in this way, sanctions might have 
a chance at success. All other measures that were tried had 
failed. Diplomacy, with its compromises and concessions, had 
not been successful and moral suasion had been futile as 
well with the fascists. "Sanctions may also fail, but they 
present the sole alternative to war.,,47 Certainly, 
collective security expressed through sanctions was not the 
sole alternative, but it was the only one, according to its 
supporters at Th Nation, that would be successful in 
containing the Nazis. 
Proponents of collective security at he Nation 
realized that all economic sanctions were, essentially, 
backed by a military preparedness to protect each other from 
the aggressions of Hitler. However, there were some 
advocates of collective action at the weekly who believed 
economic measures might not be enough to contain the 
"barbarian" Nazis. This was one view expressed in The 
Nation. "The barbarian invasion will not be repulsed by 
pacts or conventions. It will be repulsed only by 
force--perhaps economic force might be enough, although I 
doubt it, but it will have to be force of some kind.,,48 
47 Ibid •  
48 Robert Dell, "\-.'ill Germany Conquer France?," p.  
441. 
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Hitler and the Nazis were the barbarian forces. Barbarians 
are classified as such because they reject civilization's 
laws and use coercion to achieve their own aims. Barbarians 
can not be reasoned with, unless it suits their own goals. 
Force is what barbarians understand. The future for Europe 
looked bleak because 
those in France and elsewhere who have been so much 
afraid of any resort to force that they have capitulated 
to threats and yielded to blackmail may find themselves 
obliged to resort to force in much less favorable 
conditions. It is poss~~le to precipitate war by being 
too much afraid of it. 
The editors of The Nati n had been fighting the 
adoption of nondiscriminatory neutrality legislation for 
years. They believed laws could be enacted which would give 
the President the authority "to lift the embargo on 
shipments to a state . which has been unjustly 
,,50 Th' l···· hinvaded. . 1S was an extreme y sens1tlve pOlnt W1t 
the journal. Current U.S. neutrality legislation hindered 
the fulfillment of American obligations to other democratic 
nations. The United States must be allowed to direct an 
embargo against aggressor nations and not the victims. If 
the Neutrality Act was allowed to stand, without amendment, 
then Americans would find themselves in the untenable 
position of supporting the Nazis. "Neutrality followed to 
49 Ibid . 
50Editorial, "Strengthening the Neutrality Act," e 
Nation 142 (January 8, 1936):32 
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its logical conclusion has made America effectively pro-
fascist.,,51 Another point of the sanctions argument stressed 
that if any policy was to work at containing or destroying 
the fascists in Europe, it had to be collective in nature. 
Sanctions would not work unless there was a certainty of 
collective enactment. This was recognized as early as 1933 
when The Nation first advocated economic sanctions against 
Germany as the "one weapon they fear.,,52 The Nazis dreaded 
economic pressure; they realized international enforcement 
of economic sanctions would "kill even the monster they had 
created.,,53 
The supporters of collective security were not 
totally opposed to neutrality. They realized the end goals 
for both neutrality and collective action were the same: the 
prevention of U.S. involvement in a war with the Nazis. "To 
much in the argument of the neutrality advocates we can give 
unqualified support. ,,54 The aspects of neutrality that the 
weekly favored, however, were not in American policy. As a 
consequence, The Nation could not support American 
neutrality. 
51Louis Fischer, "Keeping America Out of \var," The 
Nation 144 (March 27, 1937):349. 
52Richard Neuberger, "The New Germany," p. 379. 
53 Ibid . 
54Editorial, "Pro-Fascist Neutrality," The Nation 
144 (January 9, 1937):33. 
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Advocates of collective security at The Nation 
believed it was "the greatest possible measure of war 
prevention."SS It was a simple plan once agreed upon. If one 
nation was attacked by an aggressor, like Germany, then all 
nations, united by a collective security agreement, would 
march against Germany to stop the aggression. By 1936, 
Germany was one of the most powerful nations in Europe and 
the "safety of the European powers lies in combinations 
which will offset Germany's superiority. This is the germ 
idea of collective security."S6 The Nation supported the 
United States, France, England, and the Soviet Union as 
being the foundation in worldwide collective security. The 
journal ascertained these countries had interests in common, 
not only in Europe, but in the Far East as well. Th Nation, 
in general, supported the involvement of the Soviet Union in 
a proposed collective security policy put forth in 1935. 
During the same year, the h'eekly responded to the "olive 
branch" offered by Hoscow. The Third International met in 
the Soviet Union and "has called for a united labor party of 
all groups in every country which oppose fascism.,,57 This 
was a policy the Soviet Union needed to promulgate. If their 
55LouiS Fischer, "The Soviets Face the Threat of 
~'Jar," The Nation 142 (April 8,1936):442. 
56 Ibid • 
57Editorial, "Hoscow Offers an Olive Branch," The 
Nation 141 (August 7, 1935):145. 
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plan was successful, the Soviets would have substantially 
strengthened their defenses. The Nation realized that Soviet 
motivation was based on self-interest. Nevertheless, that 
" . " .. ,,58was no reason to oppose or to mlnlmlze ltS lmportance. 
The Soviet Union was threatened by Nazi Germany, as all the 
nations of Europe were menaced by the economic and political 
aspirations of the Third Reich. The weekly believed that the 
compelling logic of self-preservation should have brought 
about an alliance of liberals and communists as they must 
foster a united front to defeat their common enemy--the 
German fascists. The Nation summed up its belief in the 
importance of the !'toscow offer. "The hope of the world may 
depend upon the reality behind the pronouncement of the 
Third International at Noscow.,,59 In addition, the USSR was 
willing to compromise: "to buttress the status quo the 
Kremlin is prepared to consider sympathetically any new 
scheme for European collective security. .,,60 But beyond 
the collective security alliance of the four nations and the 
economic sanctions, the journal expressed little else in the 
way of a concrete program. 
Freda Kirchwey, the managing editor until 1937 and 
afterwards the owner of T Nation, accepted the Soviet 
58 Ibid • 
59 Ibid . 
60LouiS Fischer, "The Soviets Face the Threat of 
\~ar," p.444. 
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· II 1·· d 1 . 1 11 ,,61 I fUnlon as a egltlmate power an a oglca a y. n act, 
Kirchwey was a staunch supporter of the Soviet Union. She 
hoped the USSR would eventually fulfill its promise of a 
worker state. Freda had been actively involved in labor 
causes and felt there was "an urgent need to alleviate the 
bleak conditions of the masses.,,62 Even though she supported 
the Soviets, continued repression by Stalin in Russia made 
it difficult for her to sustain her endorsement. The 
ideological struggle between Stalin and Trotsky and the 
purges begun by Stalin in 1934 which continued to 1938, 
jeopardized a united front against German fascism. 
Nevertheless, Kirchwey with the concurrence of two of her 
editors, Max rner and Maxwell Stewart, continued her 
support of the Kremlin because 
the collective security system against fascism was at 
stake. She adopted a moral stance of good versus the 
evil of fascism and an expedient stance regarding the 
Soviet Union. Because she regarded the Soviet Union as a 
flawed but necessary ally, she put it on the side of 
good and downplayed Soviet totalitarianism, which she 
considered temporary. A moralist against ~~scism, she 
was a relativist toward the Soviet Union. 
Kirchwey aligned The Nation with the Soviets, 
against German fascism, even though the Soviet Union 
continued its suppression of supposed Russian 
counterrevolutionaries. Liberals who believed Stalin was as 
61 Sara Alpern.  Kirchwey, p. 103.  
62 Ibid •  
63 Ibid .• p. 119.  
64 
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great an enemy as Hitler had difficulty with her stance. 
One of her critics responded with: "I believe in all-around 
disarmament also but not in moral disarmament.,,65 Kirchwey 
downplayed her critics censure, believing a disagreement 
would create a split of the left. 66 Kirchwey's all-consuming 
passion became the desire for the destruction of Hitler and 
fascism. 
Villard was not in agreement with Kirchwey and the 
board of editors and their opinions concerning the Soviets, 
at least not by 1935. Villard had admired Soviet pacifism. 
His opinion of Moscow changed after the trials of 1934-35 
and the subsequent killings. As far as Villard was concerned 
there was no difference between Stalin and Hitler. Cold-
blooded murder and tyranny, whether fascist or bolshevist, 
was still murder and tyranny. "Slaughter is slaughter, and 
64Included in the detractors of Kirchwey's position, 
were three of her own editors, Robert Bendiner, who became 
managing editor in 1938, Joseph Wood Krutch and Margaret 
Harshall. All three editors were anti-Stalinists. Michael 
Wreszin, Oswald Garrison Villard, p. 253. 
65Sidney Hook to Freda Kirchwey, June 8, 1939, #153, 
FK MSS, cited in Sara Alpern, Kirchwey, p. 126. 
66 Sara Alpern, Freda Kirchwey, pp. 125-26. Kirchwey 
also believed the pro-Soviet groups would create a rift on 
the left as their uncritical approval of Stalin would create 
dissension among liberals. Kirchwey viewed the Soviets as 
acceptable but not necessarily desirable allies, and she 
criticized their policy accordingly. 
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remains such by whomever it is done.,,67 Villard believed 
himself to still be old-fashioned, and for him "the end 
never justifies the means, and no good social order can be 
68established by bloodshed." Consequently, he could not 
accept the Soviets even if they were out to protect 
themselves and others from the Nazis. His sense of moral 
order was rigid; he believed "in moral laws, in certain 
moral imponderables and inevitabilities.,,69 Villard never 
under any circumstance was willing to deviate from his 
stance. 
In an article debating the values of neutrality 
versus sanctions, the reasons why The Nation expected the 
failure of American neutrality were clearly exposed. 
Neutrality was opposed because "it requires equal treatment 
of two belligerents without regard to the nature and origin 
of their conflict.,,70 Equal treatment, The Nation 
recognized, was impossible to achieve. No nation could 
remain indifferent to the nature of a conflict and the 
principle of equal treatment. This was especially true in 
670swald Garrison Villard, "Issues and Men: The 
Russians i'lurder Again," Th Nation 140 (January 23, 
1935) :91. 
68 Ibid • 
690swald Garrison Villard, "Issues and Hen: The 
Russian 'Purging' ," The :'Jation 139 (December 26, 1934) :729. 
70Raymond Gram Swing, "Sanctions vs. Neutrality: A 
Debate The Case for Sanctions," The Nation 141 (December 4, 
1935):641. 
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the case of the United States. Neutrality must involve 
complete impartiality. Was this possible for the United 
States? The Nation answered no. 
We must treat aggressor and aggrieved with complete 
equality. Such impartiality, or disinterestedness, might 
be possible for the residents of Samoa or even 
Argentina, but it is out of the question for Americans. 
As a leading creditor and as one of the chief commercial 
nations in the world, the United States is inextricably 
involved in world events. No great imperialistic power, 
with commitments in all parts of the earth can be truly 
neutral unless it vol~ytarily chooses to renounce its 
widespread interests. 
In addition, the lure of profits, in a society which exalts 
profitmaking, was likely to transcend any legislation 
including neutrality measures. Neutrality would not be a 
guaranty against the United States being drawn into a war. 
By 1936, the United States had enacted the 
Neutrality Act which was obviously not the answer endorsed 
by collective security advocates at The Nation. The weekly 
observed the strong isolationist sentiment that existed 
throughout the United States in 1936. Consequently, if 
neutrality was to be approved, collective security 
supporters at The Nation advocated the adoption of 
neutrality legislation that would not be inconsistent with 
the struggle for a worldwide collective security. Current 
American neutrality legislation, in addition to promoting a 
nondiscriminatory position, was also weak in other areas. 
71Editorial, "Can We Be Neutral?," Nation 142 
(February 12, 1936):173. 
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The legislation had to be altered. To begin with, provisions 
should be included that would require all trade with 
belligerents be carried on at the risk of the trader. 
Current neutrality legislation did not carry this provision, 
and according to The Nation, this was one of the reasons the 
72United States became embroiled in the last war. Also, 
based on the experiences of World War I, The Nation wanted 
the neutrality legislation to include mandatory embargoes, 
not only on war materials but on credit and loans as well 
which the current legislation did not provide for. In 
addition, the Neutrality Act did not stop trade in 
commodities such as iron scrap, oil, and copper. Effective 
neutrality legislation must call for the embargo of these 
and other war materials. Their restriction was essential in 
maintaining the United States' neutrality. The legislation 
that was finally adopted in 1936 was a far cry from what was 
necessary to keep the United States truly neutral. It did 
not contain the measures The Nation considered essential. In 
fact, the current neutrality legislation was 
no more than a breeder of delusions, that it will break 
down in the event of another world war, that another war 
is coming, that we shall be ultimately drawn in; that it 
would be better for us . [to take] some other form 
of collective action, to throw our weight on the side of 
peace and against aggression. 73 
72Editorial, "Strengthening the Neutrality Act," The 
Nation 142 (January 8, 1936):32. 
73 Geoffrey Stone, "Neutrality--A Dangerous Hyth," 
The Nation 145 (September 18, 1937):283 
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U.S. profit makers opposed the embargoes The Nation 
believed were necessary, and as a consequence they were not 
incorporated in the neutrality legislation. Therefore, the 
United States best protection against war lay in the 
prevention rather than the quarantine of war, "and wars 
cannot be prevented except through collective action.,,74 The 
periodical could not support the American neutrality law as 
passed in 1936. 
By 1937, The Nation dropped most of its attempts to 
alter neutrality legislation and became a more determined 
opponent to neutrality. This trend was due to Hitler's 
activities and because neutrality was seen as an eventual 
path to war. Many events had occurred by 1937 that caused 
The Nation to become more determined in its position. 75 The 
Rhineland Crisis, the Spanish Civil war, and other 
belligerent actions by Hitler revealed to the periodical 
further evidence of the true nature of the Nazis and that 
divergent views on the left would not stop German fascism. 
As a result, week after week the journal denounced American 
neutrality. The Nation believed neutrality could not prevent 
United States involvement in the deteriorating European 
situation. Neutrality, of a sort, was being used as a tool 
74Editorial, "Strengthening the Neutrality Act," p. 
32. 
75 Also at this time, The Nation was sold to Freda 
Kirchwey, and her support of the Soviet Union carne to 
dominate The Nation1s position after 1937. 
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by Hitler to further his pan-Ger~anic policy. In fact, 
Hitler, according to The Nation, was an eager supporter of 
neutrality because it was paving the way to victory for the 
Nazis. By attacking one country at a time, Hitler used his 
support of neutrality to keep other nations out of his 
disagreements. Only the aggressor and the attacked would 
fight in Hitler's model of neutrality. Using neutrality as a 
76 cover, Hitler would eventually control all of Europe. If 
the U.S. continued to follow this kind of policy, 
eventually, Americans would not be able to remain impartial. 
Continued reliance upon neutrality under these circumstances 
would force the U.S. into the position of aiding Hitler.77 
The lone opponent to collective security at The 
Nation was Oswald Garrison Villard. Instead, he supported 
mandatory neutrality. Villard had never favored Hitler's 
regime. In 1935, he believed that Hitler's government was 
one of the worst to ever exist. In fact, IIfor the first time 
in history a great government was being run by gangsters and 
with gangster methods." 78 Not only was Germany under the 
thumb of a dictator, but Villard envisioned Hitler as a 
76 E d ito ria l, " Ne u t r ali t y Ma k e s Iv' a r ,II T h Nat ion 1 4 4 
(February 20, 1937):200. 
77Louis Fischer, "Keeping America Out of War," p. 
347. 
780swald Garrison Villard, IIIssues and Men: 
Government by Gangsters,1I The Nation 141 (August 7, 
1935):147 
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threat to the whole world. "As long as the Hitler Government 
remains, it is a menace to the peace and welfare of the 
world, to democratic institutions, to liberty and humanity 
everywhere." 79 Although Villard recognized that the Nazis 
were dangerous and a hazard to every other nation in Europe, 
he supported neutrality. Villard's position was to cause a 
rift with the rest of the staff at The Nation. The split 
became so pronounced that the disagreement took place openly 
in the pages of the journal. By 1937, Villard's tone began 
to change. First of all, he asserted that the proposal of 
the Secretary of State to allow the President to decide 
"between the aggressor and the aggrieved seems to 
insure [Americans] taking part in future wars.,,80 Villard 
opposed discretionary embargoes and advocated mandatory 
embargoes against all belligerents with no distinction 
between the aggressor or the aggrieved. Not only did Villard 
support neutrality, he believed it was the only insurance 
that the U.S. would stay out of war. He decried any future 
involvement of the United States as "setting ourselves up as 
judges in a war with which we have no concern.,,81 Villard 
not only thought a European war was not the concern of the 
79 Oswald Garrison Villard, "Issues and Men: The 
Boycott of Germany," The N ion 139 (September 19, 
1934):315. 
800swald Garrison Villard, "Issues and Nen," The 
Nation 144 (January 2, 1937):19. 
81 Ibid . 
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U.S., he also believed Americans could become embroiled on 
the wrong side. He asked how America was to know with 
82certainty which side was the aggressor. Villard was not 
certain that Hitler was the enemy. This position was a far 
cry from his original belief that the Nazis were the 
opponents of democracy and peace. The Nation could not 
support Villard's new outlook as it seemed absurd to not 
know that Hitler was the enemy. The weekly maintained its 
belief that Villard's point of view would create an 
advantage for Hitler. Any position that cut off trade to the 
aggrieved during a war gave direct aid to the aggressor. For 
Villard to continue to support neutrality, meant he had to 
retract his former convictions about German fascism. 
Villard's ability to reverse himself put him in an 
uncomfortable moral position, or at least the weekly 
believed as much. 
By early 1939, after the Austria Anschluss and the 
agreement in Munich, The Nation acknowledged that if events 
continued unchecked, the United States "shall be forced, in 
order to survive, to fit into a framework of a Nazi 
world.,,83 The United States was faced with a crumbling world 
order evidenced by the unsuccessful attempts by the British 
and French to appease Hitler. The old rules and methods were 
82 Ibid • 
83Freda Kirchwey, "Loving Hitler Less," (Editorial) 
The Nation 148 (March 25, 1939):338. 
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not workable because of Hitler. The n knew that the ~~~~
existing Neutrality Law would have to be altered to permit 
sales of essential supplies to the non-fascist powers in 
Europe in the event of war. In addition, the United States 
should be involved in discussion with these same countries 
on ways of other possible resistance. This did not mean that 
The Nation gladly supported France and Great Britain. The 
weekly believed that these powers were only a lesser evil 
than Germany. It did not approve of the way the Spanish 
Civil war and, especially, the Czechoslovakian matter had 
been handled. These countries had been sold down the river 
and virtually murdered by the British and French. "Flanked 
by the corpses of Spain and Czechoslovakia, the powers now 
move to 'stop Hitler'. And they ask the United States to 
help. • We are faced with an alternative of evils.,,84 
However unhappy the choice between governments, the United 
States had to, eventually, support democracies over fascist 
powers. The conquest of Europe by the Nazis would only lead 
to the subjugation of the people of the world. German 
fascist rule would, for many years, obliterate human 
freedom. Certainly, France and Great Britain could not be 
trusted to create a democratic and peaceful Europe as 
evidenced by their imperialistic nature; however, they were 
a better alternative than Hitler. "It is not that we love 
84 Ibid . 
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Chamberlain and Daladier more but that we love Hitler 
less." 8S The Nation's position, at this point, as at all 
times, revealed its liberal standing. It wanted a free, 
democratic, and peaceful Europe--all liberal tenets, but it 
was also realistic enough to know what its choices meant. 
But another principle of liberalism -pacifism came 
into disfavor with he Nation. The weekly, which had held 
pacifist views in 1914, came to accept the belief that no 
action or policy would keep the United States out of the 
impending European war. Support of isolation was impossible, 
this being an unrealistic view of the American position in 
the world. Efforts to advance collective security agreements 
were by 1939, obviously, failures. The nations involved had 
never had any real unanimity, other than appeasement, among 
themselves on how to proceed with Germany. 
T Nation, in early 1939, feared that the German 
fascist terror in Europe was a menace to democracy 
everywhere. This apprehension expressed in the journal, 
would eventually evolve during the next six months into a 
more concrete fear for the United States. At first, The 
Nation's trepidation was expressed in the most general 
terms. Democracy and fascism could not survive together. One 
would finally destroy the other. If it was not to be the 
destruction of democracy, then fascism must be destroyed. 
8S Ibid . 
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"They cannot survive together, either in the same hemisphere 
or ultimately in the same world; the world is too small and 
fascism is too implacable. ,,86 By September 1939, 
Americans, according to The Nation, recognized that the 
defense of England and France was vital to the survival of 
democracy. A potential defeat of both of these countries 
would insure U.S. involvement in the war. The commitment of 
the United States would come about "because their survival 
is fatally bound up with the hope of freedom on our 
continent as in the whole world.,,87 The Nation's reasoning 
for aid to England and France was now linked directly to 
American security. With the beginning of the war in Europe 
in 1939, the argument concerning economic aid became more 
cogent; it was the one possible solution that could keep 
Americans out of the war. "[fd]e shall have to aid England 
and France by all means short of war. Defeat for the Allies 
would seriously undermine American security.,,88 If Hitler 
defeated England and France, he would then be at the very 
door of America. Due to Hitler's past record, Americans 
could not be certain that Nazi Germany would not attack. 
Hitler's record of past assurances gave The Nation no hope. 
86 Freda Kirchwey. "Let's Mind Our O,.n Business," 
(Editorial) The Nation 148 (April 15, 1939):421. 
87Freda Kirchwey, "What Americans Want," (Editorial) 
The Nation 149 (September 23, 1939):307. 
88Editorial, "American Neutrality," The Nation 149 
(September 16, 1939):281. 
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"Hitler is a liar. [E]very reason Hitler gave for 
going to war--were merely pretexts [ ] . His fantastic 
dream of conquering the world is his only truth. ,,89 
Though the bulk of this paper is centered on 1933 to 
1939, it is necessary at this point to look forward to 1939 
and 1941 to see if ation was consistent in its reaction 
to Hitler. Was the journal's response to Hitler influenced 
by the non-aggression pact in 1939 or Germany's declaration 
of war against the Soviet Union in June 1941? As Freda 
Kirchwey and others at the weekly had incorporated the 
Soviets in their stance on collective security and were 
supportive of them, it is important to discover if The 
was swayed by what happened with the USSR. 
Just before the beginning of the European war in 
1939, Germany concluded a non aggression pact with the 
Soviet Union. The Nation, though startled by Soviet 
alignment with Hitler, could not accept Stalin's actions. 
The journal editorialized "that the Moscow-Berlin axis is a 
solid and menacing fact. .,,90 Though expedience probably 
provided the motivation for the pact, the journal could not 
believe there would be a continued alliance. "[T]he long-
range ambitions of Stalin and Hitler are bound to clash. 
89"Hl'tler's CaleD.f]'3r," The ;'aNt' 149 (S ep t ber 9~ lon em • 
1939):261-62. 
90Freda Kirchwey, "Moscow-Berlin Axis," (Editorial) 
The Nation 147 (October 7, 1939):365. 
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Behind the ideologies of the two countries lie older and 
deeper conflict.,,91 Even though The Nation could minimize 
Soviet purges in its continual advancement of collectivism, 
the weekly was not able to accept Soviet defection to a 
German alliance. The German-Soviet pact did not cause The 
Nation to alter its view toward German fascism in favor of 
~oscow. The determination of the journal to oppose Hitler 
can, in addition, be seen in the weekly's analysis of 
Hitler's attack on Russia. The Nation advocated support for 
the Western democracies in opposition to Hitler in 1940, 
long before the Soviet Union entered the war on the Allies 
side. Again and again the weekly stressed the one issue of 
paramount importance in the war, the destruction of Hitler 
because he threatened everyone. The Nation insisted that 
it is not an issue which can be blurred by the 
ideological backtracking of the Communists or the past 
mistakes and treacheries of the Soviet Govern~ent. 
Hitler must be defeated and destroyed, not because he 
was in league with Stalin or because he is fighting 
Stalin today, but because he represents the one 
overwhelming menace to the We~5ern democracies and to 
freedo~ throughout the world. 
The Nation never wavered in its fear of Hitler and 
its devotion to his ruin. The journal believed the threat 
from the Nazis put democracy and the very continuance of 
civilization in jeopardy. Everything else assumed little 
91 Ibid ., p. 366. 
92Freda Kirchwey, "We Have But One Aim," (Editorial) 
The Nation 152 (June 28, 1941):740. 
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importance next to its desire for the complete annihilation 
of Hitler and his regime. 
Americans continued to want to stay out of the 
European war, according to The N tion, but they did not want 
to remain totally neutral. American interests lay with 
France and England; nevertheless, the United States did not 
want to send an army to Europe. Again, there was only one 
possible solution supported by the journal. 
Our chance of staying out of the war depends in great 
part on the amount of equipment we can ship to Britain 
and France. . The more guns we send and the sooner 
we send them, the better §~e chance that we shall not 
have to send men as well. 
The only hold out in American aid to Europe was U.S. 
troops. Even this was to eventually fall by the wayside in 
The Nation's stance on the war. By mid 1940, the journal's 
attitude had evolved further. It came out in support of 
universal military service (conscription) as the "first 
,,94program for a democratic defense. 
The Nation's support of universal military service 
and its "abandonment" of pacifism caused the former editor 
and owner, Oswald Garrison Villard, to resign. The rift 
between the editors and the former owner had grown too 
large. He could not accept the changes that had taken place 
in The Nation's attitude toward American involvement in the 
93Freda Kirchwey, "What Americans Hant," p. 308. 
94Freda Kirchwey, itA Democratic Program of Defense,1t 
(Editorial) Th Nation 150 (June 15, 1940):723. 
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war. The weekly's IIdesertion of pacifism" and absolute 
morals violated his persistent belief in a liberal 
ideology.95 Villard regretted his leaving, but it was 
necessary as it tlhas been precipitated at this time by the 
editors' abandonment of The Nation's steadfast opposition to 
all preparations for war, to universal military service, to 
a great navy, and to all war. 
The Nation was frightened by many well-intentioned 
people, which in the weekly's opinion included Villard, who 
recognized the nature of the horror facing democracy but 
seemed to believe that the terrible conditions in Europe 
were !lour concern only if we choose to make them so,II97 The 
journal viewed this kind of belief as "a retreat from the 
grimmest reality that has confronted our nation in many 
generations. ,,98 Pacifism, according to The Nation, had 
become appeasement. The weekly never supported appeasement. 
Those who continued to support pacifism believed the United 
States could continue to exist independent and free with a 
950swald 
Valedictory," The 
Garrison Villard, 
Nati 150 (June 
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29, 194
and 
0):782. 
Men: 
96 Ibid • 
97
Freda Kirchwey, "Escape and Appeasement," 
(Editorial) The N ion 150 (June 29, 1940):773. Kirchwey's 
words in this-Quotat on are almost the same words that 
Villard used in a previous issue about potential American 
involvement in the war. This was meant to be a dig at 
Villard. 
98 Ibid • 
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Europe dominated by Hitler and the Nazis. For example, The 
Nation reacted negatively to the position of another liberal 
publication, The New Republic. This vJas because it "promised 
to stand resolutely against any moral urge that might carry 
us into war because it knew so certainly that the 'evils of 
a system' could not be cured by 'killing the unfortunate 
individuals who for a moment embody the system' .,,99 The 
journal sarcastically responded to such a naive outmoded 
view of reality, which could literally endanger American 
liberties and security. "It [The New Republic] failed to 
tell us that the individuals who for the moment embody a 
system might possibly fasten a system of slavery upon us 
which would not be for the moment.,,100 The Nation could not 
support the supposition that the Nazis would not bother the 
U.S. The journal no longer understood the defeat of Nazism 
to be a program to defend the unfortunate victims of Nazi 
aggression. The Nation now believed the defeat of Hitler was 
a much more vital issue. The very survival of the United 
States and democracy were at stake. The U.S. had to become 
involved in a "stouthearted resistance" as a necessary 
protection of America's security.101 The old order no longer 
99Reinhold Niebuhr, "An End to Illusions," The 
Nat ion 150 (J u n e 29, 1940 ) : 7 7 8. A I tho ugh the rei s n-o-
evidence that The Nation responded to The New Republic on 
other issues, t certainly did so in this case. 
100 Ib "d1 •• p. 779. 
101Freda Kirchwey, "Escape and Appeasement," p. 774. 
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existed. Pacifism, collective action, and liberal principles 
no longer held the same meaning in a world that was rapidly 
changing. Th Nation saw these changes, feared the 
consequences, and realized that people's blind faith in 
morality and the goodness of men could lead to the world's 
destruction. 102 Hitler himself changed The Nation's views of 
the world. Because of Hitler's actions and the 
ineffectiveness of the policies of European countries 
dealing with Hitler, the weekly believed the United States 
would eventually be threatened by German foreign policy. The 
Nation was able to evolve with the changing circumstances 
and so progressed from a view of pacifism to a position of 
militant liberalism. 
102Reinhold Niebuhr, "An End to Illusions," p. 778-
79. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
It should be no surprise to anyone who read The 
Nation in the 1930s that its liberalism would bring it into 
continual conflict with Hitler's regime. The weekly was 
concerned with what happened in Germany as Hitler took over 
the reigns of power. It was also concerned for the rest of 
Europe as Hitler's despotism spread. German workers, women, 
and intellectuals knew a harsh life under Nazism. Jews, 
liberals, and leftists were hounded into exile or death. The 
rights of individuals were destroyed first in Germany, and 
finally in the rest of Europe as each country came under 
Nazi domination. Traditional ways of life and cultures were 
uprooted, torn apart, and discarded by a tyranny that 
acknowledged no boundary lines in Europe. Hitler, in 
striving to conquer the rest of the continent and create a 
pan-Germanic empire, unleashed methods of slaughter and 
terrorism unprecedented in world history. The Nation could 
not accept the supposition that the terrible events taking 
place in Europe were not the concern of Americans. Not only 
was it America's concern, it was also the duty of the U.S. 
to become involved. This did not mean that T Nation wished 
America to become entangled in a foreign war. As soon as the 
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journal realized the coming war was not simply a foreign 
adventure but that the preservation of democracy was 
inextricably bound to Global affairs; it had to recommend 
American support for the besieged nations of Europe. In 
1917, liberals in the aftermath of World War I could argue 
that freedom and democracy for Americans were not involved 
in European affairs. By 1938, it was certain that Hitler's 
regime was different; these same terms were in jeopardy. 
In some instances, The Nati n's response to German 
fascism was naive. When it advocated democracy as the answer 
for Austria's dilemma with Germany, this was an unrealistic 
view. Dollfuss was able to dispose of the Austrian 
socialists in 1934. It is hard to imagine that democrats 
would have fared any better than the socialists. 
The one amazing discovery made during the research 
of Th Nation's analyses and attitudes was the precision of 
its predictions in so many areas. The journal believed 
Hitler's foreign policy goals would result in war if the 
rest of Europe did not act. The Nation's accuracy concerning 
the destruction of the Jews is almost too chilling to 
believe. Though the weekly did not go far enough (as who 
could) in its description of what was intended for the Jews 
under Hitler, its poignant depiction of the Jews' treatment 
under the Nazis and its foreshadowing of events to come were 
close to the mark. In addition, The Nation published the 
horrid reality of the extermination of Jews very early on as 
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it tried to force Americans to examine what was happening to 
the Jewish people and force a reaction to their 
exterminators. 
It has been exciting for this writer to read the 
analyses of Th i n. The impact the journal had on its 
readership and the influence it had on intellectuals was 
essential in molding American opinion. As a leading journal 
of liberal opinion in the 1930s, The Nation helped make its 
prestigious readership aware of the changing realities 
imposed by Hitler's regime. Understanding the positions, 
attitudes, and concerns of a liberal periodical such as The 
Nation opens up the history of the period. The weekly's 
perspective on Hitler, the Nazis, and the rest of Europe 
reveals how the 1930s, an era of great stress and hardship, 
was interpreted and reacted to by one segment of American 
society--the liberals. The Nation, in addition, can be 
understood as the conscience of the United States. Americans 
may not have listened or paid any attention to the weekly's 
efforts, but The Nation certainly can be applauded for its 
crusade. Indirectly, through intellectuals and policy 
makers, it endeavored to influence and awaken a sleeping 
giant, the American public, to the nature of Hitler, the 
Nazis and the resultant plight and horrors for all Europeans 
who were affected by the Third Reich. 
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